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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

vs.

:

LISA DEHERRERA,
Defendant/Appellant

:

Case No. 970229-CA

Priority No.

2

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINSS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1992 as
amended)whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action may
take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for
anything other than a first degree or capital felony.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in finding the

Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act constitutional pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and pursuant
to Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.

A trial court's

determination of a legal question is reviewed for "correctness."
State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).
2.

Whether the good faith exception pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment as recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984) is applicable when evidence was obtained subsequent to a
warrantless seizure based on a suspicionless roadblock stop of
defendant, and when the trial court found that law enforcement did
not comply with the requirements of the Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint Act in conducting the suspicionless roadblock?

1

A trial

court's determination of a legal question is reviewed for
"correctness." Deli, 861 P.2d at 433.
3.

Whether a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule

is in harmony with Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution?

The

trial court's determination of a legal question is reviewed for
"correctness." Deli, 861 P.2d at 433.
4.

Whether there was a reasonable articulable suspicion that

defendant posed a threat to officer safety in order to justify a
search of Defendant's person?

Factual findings underlying a trial

court's ruling on a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah
App. 1996) .

"Clear error will be found only when the trial court's

factual findings run against the clear weight of the evidence." Id.
(citations omitted).

Although the facts are considered in a light

most favorable to the trial court's ruling, legal conclusions based
on those facts are reviewed "for correctness according no deference
to the trial court's conclusions."

State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136,

138 (Utah App.1996).
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 14

2

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE!
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a
third degree felony, in violation of § 58-37-8(2)(I), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended (Count I ) , unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of § 58-37a-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended
(Count II), driving on a revoked drivers license, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of § 53-3-227, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended (Count III), operating a vehicle without insurance, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of § 4l-12a-302, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended (Count IV), and driving with expired
registration, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of § 41-la-1307,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended (Count V ) . (R. 5-6).
At the arraignment on June 21, 1996, defendant plead not
guilty to all charges. (R. 38-39) .

Subsequently, defendant moved

to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the search was
unreasonable under both Federal and State constitutions, which the
trial court denied. (R. 110, 154). On July 8, 1996, defendant
entered a no contest conditional plea to count I pursuant to State
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 111-128).

Defendant was

sentenced on November 8, 1997, and was committed to the Utah State
Prison, (R. 172-173) .
A notice of appeal was filed on December 3, 1996. (R. 197198).

On December 13, 1996, judgment, sentence, and commitment was
3

vacated, Defendant withdrew her notice of appeal, and Defendant was
remanded to the Division of Corrections for a 60-day diagnostic
evaluation. (R. 207-208) . On March 14, 1997, Defendant was again
sentenced to the Utah State Prison. (R. 218-219) . On March 28,
1997, Defendant again filed a notice of appeal which has brought
this matter before this Court. (R. 232).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At the trial court, counsel for the State and Defence, finding
no disputed facts relative to the issues arising from the
roadblock, stipulated to the facts as contained in memoranda
submitted by Defendant and by the State. (R. 239, at 241; R. 64-82;
R. 91-102) . Defendant will recite the facts relative to the
roadblock as stated in her memorandum.
On or about September 16, 1996 Defendant was stopped by Deputy
Adams of the Utah County Sheriff's Office at a roadblock in
American Fork Canyon. (R. 82). Deputy Adams did not have probable
cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the
stop of Defendant's vehicle. (R. 82). The roadblock was allegedly
carried out pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-101 -- § 77-23105 (1992). (R. 82).
On or about June 15, 1992, Craig Madsen, Deputy Utah County
Attorney and officer Craig Turner of the Utah County Sheriff's
Office filed an application and affidavit in support of the
application to conduct an administrative traffic check-point
(roadblock) in American Fork Canyon (Tibbie Fork area).
(Supplemental Record, File #921001173, 1-39)
)).

(hereinafter (SR.

On or about June 15, 1992, the original order authorizing

the roadblock was signed by Judge Lynn W. Davis. (SR. 49-52) .
4

The

original order designated the uniformed patrol sergeant as the
command level deputy in charge of the check point. (SR. 51). The
authorized time for the roadblock was June 15, 1992 - September 30,
1992 from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. (SR. 51). The application named a
vast number of people who could participate in the roadblock. (SR.
19-20, 50) .
On or about August 31, 1992, Craig Madsen and Craig Turner
submitted a request for amendment of the original order authorizing
the roadblock. (SR. 53-57).

This amendment requested authorization

to conduct a roadblock from September 1, 1992 through November 30,
1992 from 2:00 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. (SR. 53-57).

This amendment also

requested the addition of eight names of persons who worked for the
Department of Wildlife Resources to the pool of people authorized
to participate in the roadblocks. (SR. 56). Judge Backlund signed
the amendment.
On or about December 2, 1992, Craig Madsen and Craig Turner
submitted another amendment to the original roadblock
authorization. (SR. 58-62).

This amendment requested authorization

to conduct a roadblock from December 1, 1992 through February 28,
1993 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. (SR. 58-62).

This amendment

requested the addition of seven names from the Utah Highway Patrol
to the list of authorized personnel. (SR. 61). Judge Sumsion
signed the amendment.
On or about May 26, 1993, Craig Madsen submitted another
request to modify the original order authorizing the roadblock.
(SR. 63-67). This amendment requested authorization to conduct a
roadblock from June 1, 1993 through August 31, 1993 from 12:30 p.m.
to 2:30 a.m.

(SR. 63-67).

This amendment requested the addition of
5

three names of people from the United States Forest Service to the
list of personnel. (SR. 66). Judge McGuire signed the amendment.
(SR. 63).
On or about July 7, 1994, Craig Madsen, Deputy Utah County
Attorney, and Alex Hunt of the Utah County Sheriff's Office
submitted a request to amend the original roadblock order. (SR. 6873) . This amendment requested the addition of five officers from
the Utah Highway Patrol, one officer from the United States Forest
Service, and one officer from the United States Park Service to the
authorized personnel list.

Each officer was named in the amendment

request. (SR. 72). This amendment requested authorization to
conduct a roadblock from August 31, 1994 through August 31, 1995
from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m.

Judge John Backlund signed the

amendment. (SR. 68).
On or about May 26, 1995, Craig Madsen and Craig Turner
submitted a request for amendment of the 1992 order authorizing the
roadblock in question. (SR. 74-79).

This amendment simply

requested that all certified personnel from Utah County Sheriff's
Office,

Utah Highway Patrol, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources,

U.S. Forest Service, and Utah State Parks and Recreation may
participate. (SR. 78). This amendment requested authorization to
conduct the roadblock from May 26, 1995 through August 31, 1996
from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m.

Judge Lynn W. Davis signed this

amendment on May 26, 1995. (SR. 74-79).
The facts relative to the issue arising directly from the
search of defendant's person are as follows: the vehicle in which
Defendant arrived at the roadblock was being impounded for improper
registration. (R. 250). While defendant was waiting for a ride,
6

officer Shiverdecker believed defendant appeared agitated and
upset. (R. 250). There were eight to ten officers in addition to
officer Shiverdecker on site. (R. 254). Officer Shiverdecker asked
defendant if she had any weapons, and defendant replied that she
didn't have a knife. (R. 251). Officer Shiverdecker approached to
do a Terry search, and noticed a bulge in defendant's right front
pant's pocket. (R. 251-252).

Officer Shiverdecker instructed

defendant to remove the items from her pocket, and metharhphetamine
was discovered. (R. 251-253).

SUMMARY OF ARQVMENT
First, Suspicionless seizures of people by law enforcement is
generally prohibited.

After balancing the degree of intrusion on

one's Fourth Amendment rights as a result of a sobriety checkpoint
against the societal interest in curbing drunk driving, the U.S.
Supreme Court found sobriety checkpoints to be reasonable in light
of the Fourth Amendment.

However, the roadblock in the present

case far exceeded the approved parameters of a sobriety checkpoint,
and is therefore, unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the Utah Supreme Court has followed the warrant
approach in determining reasonableness of a search and seizure
rather than the balancing analysis adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court.

In the present case, defendant was seized at a roadblock

without a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances.

The

warrant approach adopted by the Utah Supreme Court constitutes a
separate and distinct analysis under Article I, § 14 of the Utah
Constitution which prohibits suspicionless roadblock seizures.
Third, the good faith exception pursuant to United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) is inapplicable to the facts of the
7

present case because Leon only applies to the situation where an
officer relies in good faith on a warrant which he believes is
supported by probable cause.

The good faith exception was expanded

by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision in Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340 (1987) . However, the Krull extension of the Leon good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule is also inapplicable to
the facts of the present case because the trial court specifically
found that law enforcement did not comply with the Utah statute
purportedly authorizing roadblocks even though a magistrate had
rubber-stamped the roadblock plan.
Fourth, a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is
inconsistent with Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Utah

has never recognized a good faith exception under Article I, § 14
in the past, and the State did not provide any basis for the Court
to do so now.

Most all States that have actually addressed the

issue of whether a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is
consistent with State constitutional principles have declined to
adopt it.

A good faith exception promotes magistrate shopping,

discourages thorough police work, encourages magistrates to be less
careful when reviewing warrant applications because there are no
consequences, and the exclusionary rule does deter officers from
lazy police work because if they do not gather sufficient probable
cause before they obtain a search warrant, they know any evidence
obtained will be inadmissible.
Fifth, while Defendant was waiting for a ride to pick her up
from the scene of the roadblock, Deputy Shiverdecker conducted a
search of Defendant's person.

Deputy Shiverdecker did not have a

reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant posed a danger to
8

anyone, and therefore, his warrantless search of her person was
unreasonable.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT ACT (ATCA) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PURSUANT TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, § 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION
At the trial court level, the court relied primarily on
Michigan State Police v. Sitz. 496 U.S. 444 (1990) to find that the
Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act (Utah Code Annotated §§ 7723-101 thru 77-23-105 (1953 as amended)), hereinafter ATCA, is
constitutional.

However, the roadblock in the present case is

distinguishable from the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz because it was
far more intrusive than the Sitz roadblock.
A.

ATCA Is Unconstitutional Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution

It is undisputed that a Fourth Amendment "seizure1 occurs when
a vehicle is stopped at a roadblock. Sitzf 496 U.S. at 450.
In Sitzr the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
seizure that occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a "sobrietycheckpoint" is reasonable when the level of intrusion on one's
Fourth Amendment rights is balanced against the following: (1) the
state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers,
(2) the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that
goal, and (3) the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy
caused by the checkpoints.

Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449; See also Brown

v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) .
issue in Sitz

The sobriety checkpoint which was at

consisted of stopping the vehicle and briefly
9

examining the driver for signs of intoxication.

The driver was

detained further only if the officer detected signs of
intoxication.

SlLZ,

496 U.S. at 447.

Six Justices agreed that the

state has such a strong interest in controlling the drunk driving
epidemic that the minimal intrusion of the defendant's Fourth
Amendment protections was reasonable. Id.
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting, pointed out that
usually, even a minimally intrusive seizure must be justified by
some sort of reasonable suspicion. See Id. at 457.

When both the

majority and dissenting opinions are considered, it appears that if
the checkpoint/roadblock were more intrusive than a quick check to
determine if there are any obvious signs of impairment

(consistent

with intoxication), the U.S. Supreme Court would not uphold a
seizure absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
The Utah legislature codified ATCA subsequent to the Utah
Supreme Court's ruling in Sims v. State Tax Com'n, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah
1992) and the Utah Court of Appeals's ruling in State v. Sims, 808
P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991) aff'd. 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994).

ATCA is

an attempt to codify the procedure to be followed to conduct
numerous seizures of citizens at roadblocks without pre-existing
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

ATCA allows a magistrate

to issue written authority to establish and operate a checkpoint
if:
2(a) a command level officer submits to the magistrate a
written plan signed by the command level officer describing:
(i) the location of the checkpoint including geographical and
topographical information;
(ii) the date, time, and duration of the checkpoint;
(iii) the sequence of traffic to be stopped;
(iv) the purpose of the checkpoint including the inspection or
inquiry to be conducted;

10

(v) the names of the personnel to be employed in operating the
checkpoint including the name of the officer or officers in
charge at the scene;
(vi) the configuration and location of signs, barriers, and
other means of informing approaching motorists that they must
stop and directing them to the place to stop;
(vii) any advance notice to the public at large of the
establishment of the checkpoint; and
(viii) instructions to be given to the enforcement officers
operating the checkpoint;
(b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial determination
that the plan appropriately:
(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will be delayed;
(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inquiry;
(iii) minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist will
experience;
(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exercised by the
individual enforcement officers operating the checkpoint; and
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the enforcement
officers.
U.C.A. § 77-23-104(2).

Specifically, the paragraph that primarily

makes ATCA inconsistent with Sitz is § 77-23-104(2)(a)(iv) which
allows the purpose of the checkpoint to be inspecting for any
criminal activity as was done in the case at hand.

As a result of

the open-ended purpose of the roadblock, the level of intrusion
pursuant to ATCA is significantly greater than that authorized in
Sitz.

In the present case, the application in support of the

request for authorization to conduct the roadblock states the
following as the purpose of the roadblock:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(SR. 3 8 ) .

To inspect license plates, registration certificates and
insurance cards.
To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint
requirements.
To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired
by controlled substances.
To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and
other required exterior safety devices.
To inspect for other apparent criminal activity.
Generally, the purpose of the roadblock in the present

case can be simply summarized as to inspect for any criminal
activity.

Stopping vehicles at a roadblock to inspect for any
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criminal activity as is allowed by ATCA is completely different
than a checkpoint specifically designed for the purpose of reducing
drunk driving.

SjJ^z. does not even approach a finding that a

roadblock to check for any criminal activity is constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. In fact, Sitz implies that in light of
the undisputed fact that a roadblock results in a Fourth Amendment
seizure without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, there must
be a societal interest to be accomplished by the roadblock which
outweighs the citizen's right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449.
In the present case, the record is absolutely void of any
reliable facts to support any societal interest which could
possibly outweigh a citizen's right to be free from warrantless and
unreasonable searches and seizures.

Therefore, the suspicionless

stop of Defendant must be considered in the same light as the
analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse. 44 0 U.S.
648 (1979) (suspicionless stop of vehicle held to be
unconstitutional). When the purposes of the subject roadblock are
examined, it is clear that the purpose far exceeds the sobriety
checkpoint purpose approved in Sitz.
In the present case, the trial court held that ATCA had been
violated because the checkpoint was ongoing, the personnel were not
specifically listed, and the purposes were much too broad. (R.
107).

Significantly, the trial court stated in its memorandum

decision, "the roadblocks are ideally set up to check for drunk
drivers.

By broadening the search, the officers violated the third

criterion of the Sitz test and the search conducted at the
roadblock becomes too intrusive upon an individual's rights." (R.
12

106) .

But nowhere in ATCA is the purpose limited to simply

checking for drunk drivers.

The trial court apparently interpreted

the underlying intent of the statute based on the Sitz case.
Although SiiLZ is certainly an authority in considering roadblock
issues, whether or not ATCA is constitutional should not turn on
going beyond the plain language of ATCA and interpreting it in
light of

SJLLZL.

"The best evidence of the true intent and purpose

of the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of the
Act." State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995).

"Unless the

statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to
delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history." A.B. v.
State of Utah. 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17 (Utah App. 1997)
(citations omitted).
In the case of ATCA, the plain language is overly broad, but
not ambiguous.
the statute.

There is no need to look beyond the four corners of
The trial courts observation that roadblocks which

are greater in scope than a sobriety checkpoint consistent with
Sitz a^re unconstitutional (R. 106, 107), is certainly an accurate
observation; however, going beyond the plain language of ATCA and
finding that its intent was simply to allow roadblocks consistent
with &UL2, is not consistent with the rules of statutory
construction. See Hunt/ 906 P.2d at 312,
ATCA allows law enforcement officers to conduct roadblocks
which &re more intrusive than the sobriety checkpoints allowed in
SitZ/ <=md there is no evidence on the record which would support a
finding that the intrusion on Defendant^ Fourth Amendment rights
is outweighed by any particular societal interest.

Therefore, ATCA

should be found unconstitutional pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
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B.

ATCA Is Unconstitutional Pursuant to Article I, § 14 of
the Utah Constitution

Contrary to the balancing approach that the U.S. Supreme Court
adopted in analyzing the constitutionality of suspicionless
roadblock stops pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Utah Supreme
Court held in Sims, 841 P.2d 6 (finding suspicionless roadblock
stops unconstitutional) that under Article I, § 14 of the Utah
Constitution, unless there are exigent circumstances, a warrant is
required to search and seize an automobile:
Recently, this court interpreted the search and
seizure provision of the Utah Constitution differently
than the federal courts have characterized the
corresponding federal provision. In State v. Larocco,
294 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), we held that under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, a police officer
could not open the door of a car parked on a street to
inspect the vehicle identification number. This result
contrasted with the United States Supreme Court's holding
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated under similar
facts. See New York v. Class. 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
Similarly, in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-418
(Utah 1991) , we held that a depositor has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his bank records under the Utah
Constitution despite the United States Supreme Court's
contrary ruling with regard to the Fourth Amendment. See

United States v, Miller. 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
Both the Utah and United States Constitutions contain
a "reasonableness" and a "warrant" requirement. In recent
years, the United States Supreme Court has vacillated
between the warrant approach and the reasonableness
approach in developing federal search and seizure law
regarding automobiles. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469. The
result reached in Larocco reaffirmed this court's
commitment to the warrant approach under our state
constitution. Id. At 470 (""warrantless searches and
seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent
circumstances require action before a warrant can be
obtained.'" (quoting State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408,
411 (Utah 1984))).
Id. at 8.
Additionally, the Utah Court of Appeals reiterated that
Article I, § 14 provides even more protection than the Fourth
Amendment "for the primary purpose of shielding Utah citizens "from
14

the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth
amendment by the federal courts.1" State v. Jackson, 315 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26, 28 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Watts, 750 P.2d
1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988).

The Utah Supreme Court has departed

from federal search and seizure jurisprudence "[for] the purpose of
establishing a more workable rule for police and trial courts than
exists under confusing federal case law." Xd- (internal citations
omitted).
In determining the constitutionality of roadblock seizures,
the U.S. Supreme Court considered a balancing approach to determine
the reasonableness of the seizure. Sitz. 496 U.S. at 44.

However,

as the Utah Supreme Court stated in Larocco:
[T]his court will continue to use the concept of expectation
of privacy as a suitable threshold criterion for determining
whether article I, section 14 is applicable. Then if article
I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches will be permitted
only where they satisfy their traditional justification,
namely, to protect the safety of police or the public or to
prevent the destruction of evidence.
Larocco. 794 P.2d at 469-70.

In the present case, it is undisputed

an expectation of privacy exists and a seizure occurs when one's
vehicle is stopped at a roadblock.

Therefore, Article I, § 14 is

invoked, and warrantless searches will be permitted only if there
are exigent circumstances.
It is undisputed in the present case that a warrant was not
obtained prior to the seizure of defendant, and it is also
undisputed that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity prior to the stop and detention of defendant.

There is no

indication in the record of any exigent circumstances such as
safety of the police, safety of the public or threat of destruction
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of evidence which would justify the seizure of Defendant at the
roadblock in question.
The uncontroverted basis of the stop in question was a
roadblock purportedly pursuant to ATCA. (R. 110)

Because ATCA

attempts to authorize a stop and seizure of citizens without a
warrant, reasonable suspicion, or exigent circumstances, it is
unconstitutional pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
Moreover, similar to the reasons why roadblocks were found
unconstitutional in the Sims cases, ATCA violates the Utah
Constitution because it allows officers to conduct a roadblock for
any purpose.

Pursuant to Article I, § 14, a roadblock should be

conducted only when law enforcement has reasonable suspicion or
probable cause that persons to be stopped at the roadblock are
involved in criminal activities, or when there are other exigent
circumstances which justify the stop.

In the present case, the

officers were simply conducting a wholesale search for any criminal
activity in which persons approaching the roadblock may be
involved.

This type of activity must be a prime example of the

type of law enforcement activity that Article I, § 14 was designed
to prohibit against.
The only significant restriction ATCA imposes on law
enforcement personnel as a result of the Sims holdings, is that a
magistrate must affirm the roadblock will minimize the intrusion on
citizens in light of law enforcement's chosen purpose for the
roadblock. U.C.A. § 77-23-104(2)(b).

In other words, ATCA does not

require a magistrate to review the purpose of the roadblock, but
simply the means of carrying out the roadblock in light of the
16

purpose.

Therefore, ATCA does not significantly change the

rational applied in Sims, 841 P.2d 6 and Sims, 808 P.2d 141 where
suspicionless roadblocks were found to violate Article I, § 14 of
the Utah Constitution.

This Court should find that the roadblock

in the present case performed under ATCA was also unconstitutional
because it was hardly different from the unconstitutional roadblock

in Sima.
This Court should note that notwithstanding the U.S*: Supreme
Court's holding in SJJLZ., 496 U.S. 444, the Michigan appellate court
subsequently found the suspicionless sobriety checkpoint to be
unconstitutional pursuant to the Michigan Constitution. Sitz v.
Department of State Police, 485 N.W.2d 135 (Mich App. 1992) .
Consistent with the arguments made above together with the analysis

in Sitz v. Department of State Police, 485 N.w.2d 135, this court
should find ATCA unconstitutional pursuant to Article I, § 14 of
the Utah Constitution.
POINT II
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES
NOT APPLY TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT CASE
PURSUANT TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Upon consideration of defendant's motion to suppress in the
present case, the trial court found that:
. . .the plan for the administrative checkpoint did not
comply with the terms of the statute because it was
overly broad making it invalid and unconstitutional.
The statute describes various specifics with which the
administrative checkpoint must comply before it is to be
approved by the judiciary. The time, date, duration, the
names of the personnel to be employed at the checkpoint,
and the instructions and purpose of the checkpoint must
be included.
Although in the instant case the time, date and
duration are included in the plan the Court finds that an
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ongoing checkpoint which may be set up at any time over a
period of a year is entirely too long and does not meet
the intent of the statute.
Also, the names of the personnel are required to be on
the plan, in this case merely the office from which they
were to come was placed on the plan. Thus, the
specificity that the statute requires was not included in
the plan.
Lastly, the purpose as well as the instructions which
the officers have at the roadblock went beyond the scope
of the statute. The roadblocks are ideally set up to
check for drunk drivers. By broadening the search the
officers violate the third criterion of the Sitz
test and
the search conducted at the roadblock becomes too
intrusive upon an individual's rights.
(R. 106, 107).
Notwithstanding the trial courts finding that the plan for the
subject roadblock which was prepared, submitted, and followed by
the Utah County Sheriff's Office and the Utah County Attorney's
Office, was overly broad, invalid, unconstitutional, and that
various specifics of the plan were not complied with, the trial
court held: ". . .where the plan for the roadblock was submitted to
and approved by a magistrate the officers should be able to rely
upon such approval in good faith and therefore the evidence should
not be suppressed because of the good faith exception." (R. 107).
Subsequently, in responding to additional argument by defendant,
the trial court ruled: "The Court finds that there is no
requirement for the State to prove good faith when the officers
were acting pursuant to what they believed was a valid warrant
issued by a magistrate. (R. 154). The trial court's rulings were
erroneous on a number of issues.
A.

The Leon Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule is
Inapplicable in the Present Case

The trial court based its ruling on United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984). (R. 108). When Leon was decided, the United
States Supreme Court noted the good faith exception does not apply
18

where law enforcement relies on a statute that permits a
warrantless search on less than probable cause as in the present
case:
"We have held, however, that the exclusionary rule
requires suppression of evidence obtained in searches
carried out pursuant to statutes, not yet declared
unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and
seizures without probable cause or search warrants. gee,
e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Torres v.
Puerto Rico. 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). "Those decisions
involved statutes which, by their own terms, authorized
searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the
traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements of
the Fourth Amendment." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S.
at 39. The substantive Fourth Amendment principles
announced in those cases are fully consistent with our
holding here.
L&Qn, 468 U.S. 913, n.8.
Utah Code Annotated provides a definition of the type of
search warrant which if relied upon in good faith may give rise to
the possibility of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
under the Fourth Amendment:
A search warrant is an order issued by a magistrate in the
name of the state and directed to a peace officer, describing
with particularity the thing, place, or person to be searched
and the property or evidence to be seized by him and brought
before the magistrate.
A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the
person or place to be searched and the person, property, or
evidence to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201; Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203(1).
Undisputedly, the authorization to conduct the roadblock in
question, does not purport to be a warrant, and would not qualify
as a warrant even if it was held out as such. (SR. 52).
Therefore, the good faith exception does not apply to the
present case where the officers were not relying on a sworn
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affidavit ratified by a magistrate finding probable cause as was
the case in L££n.

In the present case, the good faith exception

does not apply to the circumstances as it is undisputed that the
seizure of defendant at the roadblock was done without a warrant,
without probable cause, without reasonable suspicion, and without
exigent circumstances.

The exclusionary rule should apply to

exclude the evidence seized in violation of the Fourth amendment
because the L££TL good faith exception is inapplicable. Tfonr 468
U.S. at 913, n.8.
B.

The Expanded Good Faith Exception Pursuant to Illinois v.
Krilll is Not Applicable to the Facts of the Present Case

In Illinois v. Krull. 480 U.S. 340 (1987) the U.S. Supreme
Court extended the good faith exception to cover circumstances
where law enforcement personnel relied on statutes later declared
unconstitutional to justify a warrantless search.

In the present

case, the search in question was performed in reliance on ATCA,
U.C.A. §§ 77-23-101 thru 77-23-105.

The State may argue that law

enforcement in the present case relied on ATCA, and may avoid the
exclusionary rule by application of the expanded good faith
exception.

However, when the Krull holding is applied to the

findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by the trial court
in this matter, it is apparent that even the expanded good faith
exception does not salvage the unlawful conduct of the officers in
this case from the exclusionary rule.

Krull, 480 U.S. 340; (R.

106, 107).
As discussed above, the trial court in the present matter did
not find ATCA to be unconstitutional.

Rather, the trial court

found that the plan prepared and submitted by the Utah County
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Sheriff's Office and Utah County Attorney's Office went beyond the
scope of ATCA.

The trial court found that the Utah County

Sheriff's Office did not comply with the requirements of ATCA by:
(1) failing to appropriately state the time, date, and duration of
the roadblock,1 (2) failing to appropriately state the names of
personnel (including command level officers) participating in the
roadblock, and (3) expanding the purpose of the roadblock beyond
the purpose of sobriety checkpoints allowed in Sitz. (R. at 106,
107) .
Because the trial court did not find ATCA unconstitutional,
but rather, found error in law enforcement

personnels'

actions

relative to the plan which they followed in carrying out the
roadblock, the extension of the good faith exception from Krull
does not apply. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50.
C.

Even if the Good Faith Exception is Applicable to the
Facts of the Present Case, the Utah County Sheriff's
Office and Utah County Attorney's Office Did Not Act in
Good Faith

If this Court finds the good faith exception pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment should be considered in light of the facts in the
present case, the Utah County Sheriff's Office and the Utah County
Attorney's Office did not act in good faith, and the trial court
erred by not considering the lack of "objective reasonableness" in
the purported reliance by law enforcement on the magistrate's
approval of the roadblock plan. (R. 152). Moreover, the undisputed

1

The trial court's ruling states that a "period of a
year is entirely too long and does not meet the intent of the
statute." (R. 106, 107). However, the plan followed by the Utah
County Sheriff's Office and Utah County Attorney's Office
included a time frame that was even longer, 15 months. (SR. 75).
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facts manifest bad faith on the part of law enforcement relative to
the operation of the roadblock in question.
The majority opinion in Leon held that in determining whether
the good faith exception is applicable, law enforcement must act in
good faith:
We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we
adopt is an objective one. Many objections to a goodfaith exception assume that the exception will turn on
the subjective good faith of individual officers.
"Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness,
however, retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an
incentive for the law enforcement profession as a whole
to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth
Amendment." Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S., at 261, n. 15
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment); See Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S., at 221 (STEVENS, J., concurring).
The

objective
standard we adopt, moreover, requires
to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law

officers
prohibits.

United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975).
Leon. 468 U.S. at 919, n. 20 (emphasis added).

Furthermore, the

Leon court stated that "[i]t is necessary to consider the objective
reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a
warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who
provided information material to the probable-cause determination."
Id. at 923 n.24.

Therefore, in addition to the Utah County

Sheriff's Office, the actions of the Utah County Attorney's Office,
who assisted in the preparation of the application and amendments
to conduct roadblocks, must also be considered in the determination
of whether there was objective good faith on the part of law
enforcement.
In Krull, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the objective
reasonableness requirement: "As we emphasized in Leon, the standard
of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one; the standard does
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not turn o n t h e s u b j e c t i v e g o o d faith of i n d i v i d u a l o f f i c e r s
JKTUll, 4 8 0 U . S . at 355 (citing L e o n , 4 6 8 U . S

at 9 1 9 , n . 2 0 ) .

L a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s c e r t a i n l y cannot c l a i m t o h a v e a c t e d
in o b j ect i v e g o o d fait h re 1 i ance o n A rCA when: I t: hey £ a i ] t: : comp 1 y
w i t h t h e s i m p l e , u n a m b i g u o u s checklist format of A T C A .
above

As cited

the trial court found that the law enforcement personnel

failed to comply with ATCA's requirements by r lot statii lg t:l ie date
of t h e r o a d b l o c k , t h e n a m e s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s at t h e r o a d b l o c k ,
and the g e n e r a l p u r p o s e w a s m u c h t o o b r o a d e x c e e d i n g the level of
i n t r u s i o n a l l o w e d in S i t z .

(R

106).

seems i m p o s s i b l e t o c l a i m

that l a w e n f o r c e m e n t p e r s o n n e l acted o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e in
c o m p l y i n g w - " :- - I C A w h e n t h e trial court found so c l e a r l y that t h e
p l a n p r e p a r e d , s u b m i t t e d , a n d fo] lowed b y l a w enforcemeiit p e r s o n n e l
w a s "overly b r o a d m a k i n g it invalid a n d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " (R. 1 0 7 ) .
""^ "•

^iinreme Court h a s c o n s i d e r e d t h e e f f e c t of o f f i c e r s

failing to comply with statutory requirements when relying on a
warrant.

In S t a t e v . Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah A p p . 1 9 9 1 ) , r e v ' d in

p a r t , 850 P '«! '127 (Utah 1 9 9 2 ) , o f f i c e r s failed t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e
r e q u i r e m e n t s of a "no-knock" n i g h t t i m e w a r r a n t as r e q u i r e d b y § 7 7 23-205 and § 77-23-210

(as p r e s e n t l y t i t l e d in t h e U t a h C o d e ) .

The

U t a h C o u r t of A p p e a l s held that the m a g i s t r a t e e r r e d in a u t h o r i z i n g
the n o - k n o c k n i g h t t i m e w a r r a n t a n d that:
"Police o f f i c e r s cannot ignore a n u n a m b i g u o u s s t a t u t o r y
d i r e c t i v e t o p r e s e n t t h e m a g i s t r a t e w i t h "reasonable
c a u s e t o b e l i e v e a s e a r c h is n e c e s s a r y in t h e night,"
U t a h C o d e A n n . S e c . 7 7 - 2 3 - 5 ( 1 ) (1990) [now § 7 6 - 2 3 - 2 0 5 ] ,
and t h e n c l a i m that t h e i r v e r y f a i l u r e to d o s o is
o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e conduct o n t h e i r p a r t . S e e L e o n .
468 U . S . at 919 n. 2 0 , 104 S.Ct. At 3 4 1 9 n. 20 (objective
s t a n d a r d r e q u i r e s r e a s o n a b l e k n o w l e d g e of t h e law b y
p o l i c e o f f i c e r s ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. F r e i t a s , 6 1 0 F.Supp.
1560, 1 5 7 2 (N.D.Cal. 1 9 8 5 ) (police a g e n c y must train
o f f i c e r s , w h o h a v e o b l i g a t i o n to e n s u r e that w a r r a n t
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comports with constitutional law), aff'd. 800 F.2d 1451
(9th Cir. 1986) .
Id. at 738.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of the

Utah Court of Appeals only because the Supreme Court found that
having your house searched at night, rather than in the day when it
could have been properly searched, does not constitute a
fundamental right invoking the Fourth Amendment.

The Utah Supreme

Court did not reverse the rational of the Utah Court of Appeals.
See Rowe. 850 P.2d 427. The logic of the Utah Court of appeals in
Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 is still well taken.

In light of the analysis

in Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, the fact that law enforcement failed to
provide the magistrate with a plan that complied with ATCA, law
enforcement cannot avoid the exclusionary rule by claiming good
faith reliance on the magistrate when the plan is later deemed
inconsistent with ATCA.
Additionally, the objective standard of reasonableness
requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law
prohibits. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, n. 20.

In the present case, Law

enforcement personnel including the Utah County Attorney's Office,
either knew or objectively should have known that the plan
submitted for the roadblock was not consistent with the holding of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Sitz, nor with the checklist form of
ATCA. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sitz predated the
original roadblock application in the present case by approximately
two years. &JJL&/ 496 U.S. 444.
In Sitz, the U.S. Supreme Court held that stopping a motorist
at a roadblock is a Fourth Amendment seizure; however, in light of
the drunk driving epidemic, a minimally intrusive plan to check for
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drunk drivers at the checkpoint was approved. The plai i all ::> wed

(1 )

stopping of all vehicles passing through the checkpoint; (2) brief
quest:i c: ni ng of each d:i i ver to determine if there are any signs of
intoxication, and (3) only if there is reasonable suspicion : f
impairment detected through the brief questioning would a driver be
directed out

(• the flow of traffic and be required to produce

his/her license, registration, etc. or be required to perform
further field sobriety tests. Id

496 U.S. at 447-55.

Whether law enforcement personnel had actual knowledge of the
Sitz holding, or whether such knowledge is imputed pursuant to the
objectively reasonable officer requirement of Leon and Krull. the
resu] t: :i = the same.

Nevertheless, the actions of the Utah County

Sheriff's Office and the Utah County Attorney's Office in preparing
the roadblock plans and subsequent amendments demonstrates an
intentional disregard for the plain ] anguage of ATCA.

The lack of

objective good faith is exacerbated in this case because the Utah
County Attorney's Office participated in the preparation of the
r o a d b l o c k piaiib,

Sb

> •> *\ *
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6 7, 73, 79).

Certainly,

the Utah County Attorney's Office must have known of the opinion of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Sitz together with the Utah case law on
tl le matter, ai id recog i lized that the subject plan did not comply
with the ATCA checklist, the holding in Sitz, or Utah case law.
The original application to conduct the roadblock in question
was submitted arid wai. rubber-stamped by Judge Lynn W. Davis on June
15,

1992.

The original application and authorization allowed

approximately 97 named members of the Utah County Sheriff's Office
to participate m

th>- roadblork, and allowed the roadblock to be

conducted everyday from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. for two and Vi
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months.

Upon expiration of the original term for the roadblock, a

series of amendments were submitted to at least three other judges.
Various changes were made.

Officers from other governmental

agencies were added to the authorization, and the length of time in
which the roadblocks could be operated grew to three months to 1
year to 1 year and three months.

Finally, the names of command

level officers and personnel who could participate were completely
deleted.

Any command level officer from the Utah County*Sheriff's

Office was allowed to supervise the roadblock, and any certified
personnel from the Utah County Sheriff's Office, Utah Highway
Patrol, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, Utah Forest Service,
or Utah State Parks and Recreation was allowed to participate.
Although Defendant does not believe that the original
application and authorization to conduct roadblocks at the site in
question complied with ATCA, it was substantially more compliant
than the final amended authorization that allowed virtually any
person with a uniform to participate in a roadblock for any purpose
supervised by any officer of the Utah County Sheriff's Office which
may be conducted everyday for a period of one year and three
months.

Moreover, the practice of law enforcement in this case of

submitting a roadblock plan pursuant to ATCA, and then filing
amendments over the course of the next three years is not
consistent with the plain language checklist of ATCA. (SR. 39, 57,
62, 67, 73, 79) .
In addition to the failures to comply with ATCA as addressed
above, the purpose of the roadblock was not aimed at any particular
societal evil such as the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz.

Rather, the

general purpose of the roadblocks were to inspect for criminal
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activity.

(SR
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included use of a drug sniffing dog around the vehicle. (SR. at: 26,
38, 4 6 ) .
"T"i lere i s i 10 evI.dei ICe of ofaj ect ive good fa i t:h oi :i, t:he part: of
law enforcement personnel in operating the roadblock in question,
and therefore, the trial court's application of a good faith
except ion t: ::> t:l le exc ] i is ionary rule should be reversed.
POINT III
A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS
INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE I, § 14 OP THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION
A.

UTAH H. A S NO"! ADOPTED A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION" TO ARTICLE I,

The Utah Supreme Court has never recognized a good faith
exception pursuant to Article 1, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Rowe. 8 06 P. 2d

.' /JiJ

n

, .tate v. Mendoza

(Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).

748 P ?d I.1

Accordingly, the evidence

obtained when law enforcement officials violated Defendant's
constitutional r ights i mder Ar tic] e 1 Section 14 should bf1
suppressed.
In Larocco, the Supreme Court expressly held that the
"exclusion : f i] legal 1 } obtained evidei ice :i s a necessary
consequence of police violations of article I, section 14." 794
P.2d at 4 7 2 . The Court chose not to rule on the scope of the
exclus:i onar y i u 11 e oi

1 iet:hei a doctrine para] 1 e 1 to t:he I ieoi i

exception applied to the Utah Constitution

See Id. at 473

The "good faith exception" is subject to much criticism.

The

three dissenting just j ces in Leon, Justices Brennan, Stevens, ai id
Marshall, articulated many reasons why a good faith exception is
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inconsistent with American jurisprudence.

The dissenting justices

in Leon criticized the rational of the majority that there is no
deterrent effect to the exclusionary rule when police officers act
with objective good faith, and assert that the exclusionary rule
stands for much more than simply to deter a single police officer
from infringing on a citizen's rights:
Indeed, by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the
judiciary becomes a part of what is in fact a single
governmental action prohibited by the terms of the *.
[Fourth] Amendment. Once that connection between the
evidence-gathering role of the police and the evidenceadmitting function of the courts is acknowledged, the
plausibility of the Court's interpretation becomes more
suspect. . . .It is difficult to give any meaning at all
to the limitations imposed by the Amendment if they are
read to proscribe only certain conduct by the police but
to allow other agents of the same government to take
advantage of evidence secured by the police in violation
of its requirements. The [Fourth] Amendment therefore
must be read to condemn not only the initial invasion of
privacy--which is done, after all, for the purpose of
securing evidence--but also the subsequent use of any
evidence so obtained.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 933-34 (Brennan, J., and Marshall J. dissenting)
(internal footnotes omitted).

Justice Brennan goes on to write

that the exclusionary rule as it existed before Leon "is more
faithful to the meaning and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and to
the judiciary's role as the guardian of the peoples constitutional
liberties. . . .[T]he evidence-gathering role of the police is
directly linked to the evidence admitting function of the courts,
[and] an individual's Fourth Amendment rights may be undermined as
completely by one as by the other." Id. at 938.
It seems apparent that if evidence is consistently excluded
when police officers violate a citizen's Fourth Amendment and
Article I, §14 rights, whether the violation is intentional or not,
police departments will be prompted to instruct their officers to
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devote greater care and attention to fulfill i i ig their jobs ii 1
harmony with constitutional principles. Id. at 955.

However,

adopti on of a good faith exception pursuant to Article I, § 14 will
promote police ignorance and magistxale whopping tic t m d

t lie judge

who will stretch the limits of the constitution. Id. at n.14.
Add i t ional] y, police incentive to work just a little harder to
corroborate tips and gain more evidence before intruding on one's
rights will be lessened if a good faith exception is adopted, and
magistrates who wi ] ] 3ign bare bone warrants or applications to
conduct roadblocks will be sought out. Id.
Moreover, one year prior to the L£2H ruling, the U.S. Supreme
Cc)in: t adopted a "total i ty c: f the circumstances" test for probable
cause determinations in the ruling in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983) .
[I]t is virtually inconceivable that a reviewing court,
when faced with a defendant's motion to suppress, could
first find that a warrant was invalid under the new Gates
standard, but then, at the same time, find that a police
officer's reliance on such an invalid warrant was
nevertheless "objectively reasonable" under the test
announced today. Because the two standards overlap so
completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could be found
invalid under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it
could be seen as objectively reasonable; otherwise, we
would have to entertain the mind-boggling concept of
objectively reasonable reliance upon an objectively
unreasonable warrant.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 958-59.

Justice Stevens in his dissenting

opinion makes a similar comment: "The Court's conclusion that such
searches undertaken i :i tl lout probable cause can nevertheless be
"reasonable" is totally without support in our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Id. at 967 (Stevens J., dissenting)

Justice

Stevens further stated: "an off d cer ' s good L:i i t-.h cannot make
otherwise

unreasonable1 conduct reasonable (citations omitted).
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The majority's failure to appreciate the significance of that
recognition is inexplicable." Id. at 969, n.19.

In order to avoid

the confusing quagmire of the totality of the circumstances test
overlapping with the objective reasonable good faith standard, Utah
should continue to adhere to the clear-cut exclusionary rule
requiring suppression of evidence acquired as a result of a search
in violation of Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Most states that have actually addressed the issue of whether
a good faith exception is consistent with its respective State
constitutional principles which protect its citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures have agreed with the rational in
the dissenting opinions in Leon, and have found that a good faith
exception to the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures is inconsistent with its respective State constitution.
1.

CONNECTICUT

Connecticutfs rejection of Leon in State v. Marsala. 579 A. 2d
58 (Conn. 1990), could easily be read as a text for other states
wishing to weigh the good-faith rule against their own
constitution.

Justice Shea, writing for a unanimous court, found

that the good-faith exception was incompatible with the state
constitution, although the Connecticut constitutional provision
against unreasonable searches and seizures is virtually identical
to the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 62.

In short, the Connecticut

court refused to "sanction a practice in which the validity of
search warrants might be determined under a standard of "close
enough is good enough' instead of under the "probable cause1
standard mandated by article first, § 7, of our state
constitution."

Id. at 70.
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J u s t i c e S h e a f o i l o w e d t h e est:ab 1 ished d:i r ec11 v es a n d b a s e d t:i ie
d e c i s i o n o n i n d e p e n d e n t state g r o u n d s that went "beyond t h o s e
[ p r o t e c t i o n s ] p r o v i d e d b y t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , a s that
d o c u m e n t h a s b e e n inter p r e ted 1: y the IJn i ted States Supreme Court "
Id. at 63.
Not only did the Connecticut court reject Leon, it challenged
the Supreme Court's entire analysis of the costs and bene:-'
excluding evidence obtained in good-faith.
«-v •=> ^nr,ts

of

Justice Shea*wrote that

would actually exceed any potential benefits from

admitting evidence because:

1) police officers wou.H spend more

time "judge shopping" than trying to establish necessary probable
cause;

2) ji idges would be less careful in reviewing warrant

applications as there would be no consequences i f t:l ley made a
mistake; and 3) the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter
f u t u r e p o .1 i c e m i s c o n d u ct and, m o re i m p o r t a n t l y , p r o t e c t

judicial

i n t e g r i t y to e n s u r e c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e i s s u i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s
state constitution.
2 .

: * ie

Id, at 6 7 - 6 8 .

~ ~~~ : w ; h *]

T h e D e l a w a r e S u p r e m e Court h a s n o t c o m p l e t e l y r e j e c t e d L e o n
bi i t

:i t: • :i :i I express it' s reluctance to make "an unprecedented break

with more than two hundred years of history" by adopting the goodfaith exception in Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242 (Del. 1987).
Although the court rejected the application of Leon in this case,
the decision only effected wneLn-: n ^ood-faith exception waul. I be
recognized for violation of the statutory requirements necessary to
make a valid nighttime search of a residence.
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Id. at 254.

Although not a far-reaching decision, the Delaware Court did
take an important step in finding that Delaware statutes and the
state constitution must be met before Leon could be accepted.
3.

Id.

GEORGIA

The Georgia Supreme Court rejected Leon in a unanimous
decision in 1992.

Gary v. State. 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992).

The

Georgia court based its rejection of Leon on independent state
grounds, but took the distinctive approach of focusing m6stly on
statutory law and only briefly acknowledging the probable cause
requirements found in the Georgia constitution.
4.

Id. at 428-29.

HAWAII

The Hawaii Supreme Court criticized the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in l&on,

and declined to adopt a good faith exception in

State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889 (Hawai•i 1995) (spelling of "Hawai•i"
consistent with original).

"Although we acknowledge that the

Hawai'i exclusionary rule serves the valuable purpose of deterring
governmental officials from circumventing the protections afforded
by the Hawai'i Constitution (citations omitted), we now pronounce
that an equally valuable purpose of the exclusionary rule under
article I, § 7, is to protect the privacy

rights of our citizens."

Id. at 902 (emphasis in original).
5.

IDAHO

In 1989 the Idaho Supreme Court adopted Leon in State v.
Prestwich, 783 P.2d 298 (Idaho 1989), but later reversed and
rejected the good-faith exception on state constitutional grounds
in a 3-1 decision.

State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992) .

After a historical review of both federal and state exclusionary
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rules., the Idaho Supreme Coux t rejected L^^H because 1 r was
"incompatible with the multiple purposes behind [the] independent
state exclusionary rule."

Id. at ^"1

from the United States bup;c^

The court distanced itself
finding that deterrence was

only part of the justification for the exclusionary rule.

Justice

P. i^rline wrote that the reasons for Idaho's exclusionary rule were
three-fold:

to deter police misconduct; t n pievenl. -m additional

and independent constitutional violation by the court by* admitting
tainted evidence; and to protect the integrity of the judicial
system.

Id.

i.

MASSACHUSETTS

Less than one year after Leoi i, Massachu ••*::s

. .g:-:-* -; ^urt

summarily rejected the decision in a footnote in Commonwealth v.
IZBtflB

476' N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985).

The Massachusetts court found

that state statutes "require that warranto b»- issueu! oril> il there
is a showing of probable cause and

.requires the suppression of

^ " ; ^ r " ^ .de* I z^d pursuant to a warrant not based on probable cause."
Id. at 554.

Because of these state requiren lei its, til: le court wrote

that they were precluded from even considering the hoon
except iori
'

good-faith

I > I at 5 54 f n. 5 .
MISSISSIPPI

The Mississippi Supreme Court essentially declined to adopt
the rational ot the U.S. Supreme Court i n Leon, and stated:
"Enforcement of the [exclusionary] rule places the parties in the
position they would have been in had there been
the defendant's constitutiona

i ..j;-r

>

no violation of

- ;: -ear^r^s

:

ar\d

seizures] made pursuant to warrants issued without probable cause."
SLllns^J^JL^2X^L^f

491 So.2d 837, 850 (Miss. 1986).
33

8-

NEW HAMPSHIRE

New Hampshire, like many states, applied the Leon good faith
exception pursuant to the Fourth Amendment until the good faith
exception was challenged based on independent state grounds; when
that challenge occurred, New Hampshire declined to follow Leon:
"The exclusionary rule serves to redress the injury to the privacy
of search victim and guard compliance with the probable cause
requirement of part I, article 19." State v. Canelo, 653*A.2d 1097,
1105 (N.H. 1995).
9.

NEW JERSEY

The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the Leon decision after
finding the state constitution afforded greater protections than
the federal constitution in State v. Novembrino. 519 A.2d 820 (N.J.
1987).

Although the New Jersey constitution is virtually identical

to the federal constitution in its search and seizure standards,
the New Jersey court found that any application of Leon would
"undermine the constitutionally-guaranteed standard of probable
cause, and. . .disrupt the highly effective procedures employed by
our criminal justice system. . . . "

Id. at 857.

The majority opinion heavily criticized the United States
Supreme Court for limiting the reasons for the exclusionary rule to
deterrence.

Justice Stein wrote that deterrence was not the only

function of the exclusionary rule, it "also serve[d] as the
indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches."
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Id. at 856.

NEW MEXICO
Tl le New Mexico Supreme Court used a unique line of analysis in
rejecting the good-faith exception in State v. Gutierrez. 863 P 2d
1052 (N.M. 1393)

The New Mexico court disagreed with the U S.

Supreme Coin I '
" i fi ndi „g that the exclusionary rule is a
See

created remedy."

Leon 468 U S. at 906.

- idicially

Instead, zne iNew

Mexico court found that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
u - r-e-*es«%

» effectuate . . . the constitutional right of the

accused to be free from unreasonable search and seizure."
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d at 1067.
Mex;- '

This line of analysis allowed the New

-:scount and avoi d the entire deterrence debate.

For this court, a good-faith exception was simply incompatible with
the state constitution.

Gutierrez 863 P.2d at 1068.

)RK
New York's highest court hastily dismissed the good-faith
except.:;

-

r ar~>-aphs

in

People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451

(N.Y. 1985) .

The court found that accepting Leon would "completely

frustrate" the purpose of the exclusionary rule, reward illegal
police behavi or and f
acts.

"uragp

*

- officers '• * engage in illegal

Id. at 458.
12.

NORTH CAROLINA

The North

Carolina

Supreme Court rejected

Leon pursuant

to

its

state constitution and state statutory law in State v. Carter, 370
S

"

±?bo) .

The North Carolina court justified leaving

the exclusionary rule unmodified as the state legislatore had
adopted the exclusionary rule to protect against unreasonable
sear^r

—;./.>-*-

^ 7 , long before the United States Supreme
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Court required the states to do so in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).

£&r£££, 370 S.E.2d at 556.

The North Carolina court stated that the exclusionary rule was
necessary to protect judicial integrity and "the only effective
bulwark against governmental disregard for constitutionally
protected privacy rights."

Carter. 370 S.E.2d at 559.

The court

also found that "decency, security, and liberty" required rejection
of the good-faith exception or crime, contempt for the Law, and
anarchy would possibly result.
13.

Id.

PENNSYLVANIA

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in

Commonwealth v.

Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1990), is another model decision for
states to follow.

The Pennsylvania court vigorously denied that

the exclusionary rule was used only to deter errant police and
based their exclusionary rule on the state constitutional right of
privacy and the probable cause standards necessary to justify a
warrant under the state constitution and state statutory laws.

Id.

at 899.
Justice Cappy, writing for the majority, conducted a lengthy
historical overview of the federal and state exclusionary rules,
concluding the probable cause standard "is designed to protect from
unwarranted and even vindictive incursions upon our privacy[,]. .
.insulates from dictatorial and tyrannical rule by the state, and
preserves the concept of democracy that assures the freedom of its
citizens."

Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899.

Because of the important

position held by the probable cause standard, the majority agreed
that the good-faith exception would "virtually emasculate those
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clear safeguards which have been carefully developed under
Pennsylvania Constitution over the past 200 years."
I1

VERMONT

the

Id, at 899.

• •

The Vermont Supreme Court rejected the good-faith exception as
i» violated the probable cause standards set forth in the state
constitution and the st-ate rules ot criminal proceduie in State v.
Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991)

The Vermont court strongly

disagreed *r*"h the cost/benefit analysis employed by the United
States Supreme Court in Leon calling it an attempt "1 J '
this time cannot be done.

There simply are insufficient

*: ~
empirical

data fi ::>r the costs and benefits of a good faith exception to be
accurately assessed "

Id. at 12 6.

The Vermont court saw various costs that the Supreme Court did
not consider, i nc] uding an increase in magistrate shopping,
increased mistakes from inadequate police presentations and less
responsibility for issuing magistrates.
\

Id. at 125-26.

si gnificant m n: iiber of states have followed the U . S . Supreme

Court's lead in Leon and adopted the good faith exception.
However, most states which have followed Leon have not yet
subjected th<° Issue tn independent State constitutional analysis.
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that it would not
adopt such a position of blind adherence to the U.S. Supreme Court.
See &1LI12, "ii i1 .M >

'W"[T]his court interpreted the search and

seizure provision of the Utah Constitution differently than tlle
federal courts have characterized the corresponding federal
provisi or i") .
At the trial court, Defendant briefed the issue that pursuant
to Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution there has never been a
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good faith exception recognized, and the State did not present any
justification for the Court to adopt such an exception now.
Defendant asserts that the rational of the dissenting Justices in
LfiCn, and the analysis of the various States who have declined to
follow hson,

is more consistent with the broader protection of

citizens provided by Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution than
the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. See Sims. 841
P.2d 6; Larocco, 294 P.2d 460; and Thompson. 810 P.2d 415.

This

Court should not create a "good faith exception" under the Utah
Constitution, and should continue to follow Utah Constitutional
precedent which requires suppression of evidence seized illegally
as a result of warrantless searches and seizures or warrants which
are not supported by probable cause.
B.

If the Court Finds That the Leon Good Faith Exception is
Consistent With Article I, § 14, the Court Should Find
That the Extension of the Good Faith Exception in Krull
is Not Consistent With Article 1/ §14

Although Defendant asserts that no good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule is consistent with Article I, § 14, if the
Court should adopt the Leon good faith exception, the Court should
not adopt the extension of the good faith extension in Krull, 480
U.S. 240.
Justice O'Connor who was part of the majority opinion in Leon,
was joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice
Stevens in dissenting against the majority opinion in Krull. Id,
The dissenting Justices argued that the rational in support of the
holding in Leon, does not support the extension of the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule advocated by the majority
opinion in Krull.

Defendant urges the Court to adopt the arguments
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of Justice O'Connor when considering l lit; lixjjJJ. extension of r lie
exclusionary rule in 1 ight of whether such an extension is
consistent with Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Justice O'Connor recognizes l

• - s: .:

_

ne

good faith exception "provide[s] a grace period for
iinconst:itutional search and seizure legislation during which the
State is permitted to violate constitutional i equirements with
impunity." Krull, 480 U.S. at 361.

Justice O'Connor continued:

"Leon"H rationale does not support this extension of its rule, and
the Court is unable to give any indepenuei:

-rxson i i i defense of

this departure from established precedent." Id.
„
" :t" AT iires authorizing unreasonable searches were the core
concern of the Framers of the Fourth Amendmei it." Id.

-. *.; .

The

principle that legislature cannot authorize unreasonable searches
has been embodi^-^ :> * the Fourth Amendment, and exclusion of
evidence obtained as a result of unreasonable sear ches lias always
been the remedy. £££ Ybarra v, Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Torres

iLu. Puerto-Riga 442 u s. 4 65 (1979); Almeida Sanchez yT United
States. 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 4U
(1968); Beraer v. New York. 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Weeks v. United
States. 23 2 U.S, 383 (1914) .
Moreover, Justice O'Connor draws a distinction between the
holding in Leon where the majority found that there is no need to
deter Hie judi^Liry, >uid the holding in Krull that allows
legislature a grace period with impunity in passing
unconstitutional statutes:
Judicial authorization of a particular search does not
threaten the liberty of everyone, but rather authorizes a
single search under particular circumstances. The
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legislative Act, on the other hand, sweeps broadly,
authorizing whole classes of searches, without any
particularized showing. A judicial officer's
unreasonable authorization of a search affects one person
at a time; a legislature's unreasonable authorization of
searches may affect thousands or millions and will almost
always affect more than one. Certainly the latter poses
a greater threat to liberty.
Krull, 480 U.S. at 365.
Defendant's assertion is that whether it is one person or
millions of people whose rights have been or will be violated, the
exclusionary rule should apply.

However, Justice O'Connor's

observation of the far greater intrusion on citizen's Fourth
Amendment rights as a result of legislative action should certainly
be well taken.
One of the reasons the Utah Supreme Court has diverged from
federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is "for the purpose of
establishing a more workable rule for police and trial courts than
exists under confusing federal case law." State v. Jackson, 315
Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (April 1997).

The confusing decision in

Krull is just such a decision that citizens from Utah should be
protected from.

Relative to the clarity and practicality of the

extension of the good faith exception in Krull, Justice O'Connor
states:
the rule [the court] adopts is both difficult to
administer and anomolous. The scope of the Court's goodfaith exception is unclear. Officers are to be held not
to have acted in good-faith reliance upon a statute if
its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should
have known that the statute was unconstitutional. . .
.(citations omitted) [I]t is not apparent how much
constitutional law the reasonable officer is expected to
know.
Krull, 480 U.S. at 367.
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F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e K.i u 13 c:i e c i s i o n w o i 13 <:i :::: i : • = a t e a ::: h i 11 i i i g e f f e c t
on the check and balances normally applied to legislation.

If a

criminal defendant has no hope of benefitting by paying the
exiiorbant attorney "" s I ijes dnd uU IUL costs I:Jn. 11 •"1v,° "o^Pq^piry» to
challenge a statute through the appeal process, ne likely will not
do it

" [T]he failure to apply the exclusionary rule in the very

case inn which a stat>-

atute is

held I '« hav> violated \\he Fourth

Amendment destroys all incentive on the part of individual criminal
defendants to litigate the violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights." IJL_

9.

Even if the Court finds that the Leon good faith exception is
consistent with Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, the Court
should f :i nc:i t: 1: i<=: t: t:I: Ie 1 Iz ull extension of t: 1 Ie 1 i eon except:i oi I is not
consistent with Article I, § 14, and require evidence gathered in
the present case to be suppressed.
POIN Il" II
THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT POSED A
RISK TO OFFICER SAFETY IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THE TERRY
SEARCH.
The trial c :>i n : t: 1: Eil d that the search of defendant' s person was
justified due to exigent circumstances which supported a Terry type
search. (R. 106-106.1); Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

"The

filsk for dangerous weapons is a "carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault [the officer].'" State v. Rochell.
8:-0 -

A -'" •

4

'n- ./*-• -

~99:) (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 30).

In order to justify a Terry frisk, an officer must demonstrate
""specific and articulable facts which, taken together with

rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.'" Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
21).

Additionally, when conducting a proper Terry frisk, the scope

of the search must be limited to a pat-down of the outer clothing
of the suspect in an effort to discover guns, knives, clubs, or
other weapons that could be used to assault the police officer.
Rochell 850 P.2d at 483.
The Utah Legislature has codified the Terry frisk scenario in
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-16 (1990) : "A peace officer who has
stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person
for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other
person is in danger."
When considering the facts of the present case in light of
Utah statutory and case law, it is evident that Deputy Shiverdecker
did not have the right to conduct a Terry frisk in the first place,
and even if he did properly instigate a Terry frisk, he exceeded
the permissive scope of a Terry frisk by instructing Defendant to
remove the items from her pocket instead of conducting a pat down
search. (R. 239, at 251-252).
A.

The Facts Surrounding the Encounter Between Deputy
Shiverdecker and Defendant do not Support a Reasonable
Belief That the Officer or Any Other Person Was in
Danger.

In order for a police officer to conduct a proper Terry stop,
he must comply with a two prong test: (1) the initial stop must be
legally justified, and (2) subsequent actions must be within the
scope of circumstances which justified the initial stop. Terry, 392
U.S. at 19-20.

In the present case, Deputy Shiverdecker made

contact with Defendant as a result of a roadblock stop.
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Defendant's arguments that the initial stop was not justified
pursuant to the first prong of the test are set forth above in this
brief.
Defendant had been a passenger in a vehicle that was being
impounded for improper registration, and was waiting near the cite
of the roadblock for a ride home. (R. 251). Deputy Shiverdecker
testified that Defendant was agitated due to the circumstances, and
therefore, he asked her if she had any weapons on her. (R. 251).
Defendant replied that she did not have a knife.

Deputy

Shiverdecker then asked her if she had any sharp objects, and
Defendant said no. (R. 251). Deputy Shiverdecker then asked her to
remove the items in her pocket, and subsequently, methamphetamine
was found in her pocket. (R. 253) .
Notwithstanding Defendant's nervousness, and Deputy
Shiverdecker's uncomfort with the manner in which Defendant
answered his questions, there was no reasonable suspicion that
Defendant posed a danger to justify a Terry search.

In addition to

Deputy Shiverdecker, there were eight to ten other deputies present
(R. 254) , and the encounter with defendant was in the daylight
where defendant could be easily observed while she waited for a
ride. (R. 255) .
11

[T] he test for reasonable belief to frisk is objective."

Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483.

An objectively reasonable officer would

not have feared that he or any other person was in danger at the
time he conducted the Terry search of defendant.

Therefore, the

evidence found on Defendant's person should be suppressed.
B.

Deputy Shiverdecker Exceeded the Scope of a Proper Terry
Frisk.
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In as much as a Terry frisk is a narrow exception to the
warrant requirement, its scope is confined to a pat-down of the
outer clothing to determine if the suspect has any dangerous
weapons which could impose a threat to the officer or another
person. (U.C.A. § 77-7-16).

In the present case, Deputy

Shiverdecker did not even bother to conduct the pat down search and
instead conducted a full blown search by requesting Defendant to
empty her pockets. (R. 251)

First, if Deputy Shiverdecker had

truly been concerned that Defendant had a weapon, he certainly
would not have given her the opportunity to gain access to that
weapon by allowing her to remove the items from her pockets.
Second, by making Defendant remove all the items she had, Deputy
Shiverdecker searched everything that Defendant had on her person
rather than only items which could be dangerous.
The Utah Court of Appeals considered the issue of when an
encounter between a defendant and police evolves into a level two
stop and seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.

The Court held

"that defendant was seized for purposes of the fourth amendment at
least

at the point where [the officer] asked to conduct a pat-down

search of defendant." State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah App.
1991) (emphasis in original).

Thus, in the present case, once the

officer exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk by asking Defendant to
remove the objects from her person instead of patting her down for
possible weapons, the encounter between Deputy Shiverdecker and
Defendant became a level two encounter. State v. Deitman, 73 9 P.2d
616, 617 (Utah 1987).

In order to justify a level two encounter,

an officer must have an articulable suspicion that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime. Id.
44

At the time that

Deputy Shiverdecker instructed Defendant to remove objects from her
person, he did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that
Defendant had committed a crime (other than the cited traffic
offenses), and Deputy Shiverdecker's subsequent alleged discovery
of contraband was the result of a search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Therefore, any and all items discovered on Defendant's person
should be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court should reverse
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and
remand the case to the Fourth District Court with directions to
suppress the evidence and dismiss the charge.
Respectfully submitted this

Q

day of August, 1997.

Randall K. Spencer
Attorney for Deherrera
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant this

ft

day of

August, 1997 to the following: Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114,

46

ADDENDA

47

Tabl

Michael E. Jewell (6254)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorneys for Defendant
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone 379-2570
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS Re: Roadblock

vs.
CASE NO. 961400364
USA DEHERRERA,
Defendant.

JUDGE RAY M. HARDING

COMES NOW Defendant by and through her counsel of record, Michael E. Jewell,
and submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of his motion to
suppress evidence illegally obtained by the State from Defendant.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

On or about September 16, 1996 Defendant was stopped by Deputy Adams of the

Utah County Sheriff's Office at a roadblock in American Fork Canyon.
2.

Proportedly, signs were posted informing Defendant of the roadblock and stating

"No U-turn."
3.

Deputy Adams did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity to justify the stop of Defendant's vehicle.
4.

The roadblock was allegedly carried out pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-

101 - § 77-23-105 (1992).
5.

On or about June 15, 1992, Officer Craig Turner of the Utah County Sheriffs

Office filed an application and affidavit in support of the application to conduct an
administrative traffic check-point (roadblock) in American Fork Canyon (Tibbie Fork area).
6.

On or about June 15, 1992, the original order authorizing the roadblock was signed

by Judge Lynn W. Davis.
A. The original order designated the uniformed patrol sergeant as the command
level deputy in charge of the check point
B. The authorized time for the roadblock was June 15, 1992 — September 30,
1992 from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m.
C. The application named a vast number of people (see exhibit E of original
application contained in Provo Circuit Court File #921001173) who could
participate in the roadblock.
7.

On or about August 31, 1992, Craig Turner of the Utah County Sheriffs Office

submitted a request for amendment of the original order authorizing the roadblock(s).
A. The amendment requested authorization to conduct a roadblock from September
1, 1992 through November 30, 1992 from 2:00 p.m. to 2:30 a.m.
B. The amendment also requested the addition of eight names of persons who
worked for the Department of Wildlife resource to the pool of people authorized to
participate in the roadblocks.
C. Judge Backlund signed the amendment on August 31, 1992.
8.

On or about December 2, 1992, Craig Turner submitted another amendment request

of the original order authorizing the roadblock(s).
A. This amendment requested authorization to conduct a roadblock from
December 1, 1992 through February 28, 1993 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30
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a.m.
B. This amendment also requested the addition of seven Utah Highway Patrol
officers added to the list of authorized personnel.
C. Judge Sumsion signed the amendment on December 2, 1992.
9.

On or about [not dated presumeably in May, 1993] Craig Turner submitted another

request to modify the original order authorizing the roadblock(s).
A. This amendment requested authorization to conduct a roadblock from June 1,
1993 through August 31, 1993 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m.
B. This amendment also requested the addition of three people from the United
States Forest Service who were named specifically in the request.
C. Judge McGuire signed the amendment on or about May 26, 1993.
10.

On or about July 7, 1994, Alex Hunt of the Utah County Sheriffs Office submitted

a request for amendment of the 1992 order authorizing the roadblock in question.
A. This amendment requested the addition of five officers from the Utah Highway
Patrol, one officer from the United States Forest Service, and one officer from the
United States Park Service. Each officer was named in the amendment request.
B. This amendment requested authorization to conduct a roadblock from August
31, 1994 through August 31, 1995 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m.
C. Judge John Backlund signed the amendment on or about July 7, 1994.
11.

On or about May 26, 1995, Craig Turner submitted a request for amendment of the

1992 order authorizing the roadblock in question.
A. This amendment requested significant changes in the personnel who will be
employed at the roadblock. Rather than the pool of deputies and officers which
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were previously submitted, the amendment requested that all certified personnel
from the following agencies be authorized to participate:
1. Utah County Sheriff s Office
2. Utah Highway Patrol
3. Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
4. U.S. Forest Service
5. Utah State Parks and Recreation
B. This amendment requested authorization to conduct the roadblock from May 26,
1995 through August 31, 1996 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m.
C. It appears Judge Lynn W. Davis signed this amendment on May 26, 1995.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ROADBLOCK IN QUESTION WAS CONDUCTED IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE I, § 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
The United States Supreme Court through Justice O'Connor has encouraged state

courts to decide search and seizure issues on state constitutional basis.

Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The tendency of the Utah appellate courts however, has been to look
first to the U.S. Constitution and then to the State Constitution. In the present case,
Defendant believes that the rational for suppressing evidence when considering the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution is significantly different, but under
either rational, the result reached by the Court should be to suppress all evidence found as a
result of the roadblock in this matter.

FILED
KAY BRYSON #04 73
Utah County Attorney
MARIANE 0'BRYANT #5442
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, UT 84606
(801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY# STATE OP UTAH
THE STATE OP UTAH,
t

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIPP'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES

i
s
vs.

s

LISA DEHERRERA,
Defendant(s).

x

Case No. 961400364

:

Judge Ray M. Harding

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through Deputy County Attorney
Mariane 0'Bryant, and respectfully submits this Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Memorandum of
Points and Authorities.
FACTS
On September 16, 1995, the defendant, Lisa Deherrera drove her
vehicle towards a judicially approved administrative checkpoint
located on State Road 144, near the Tibbie Fork Junction, in
American Fork Canyon.

The Defendant was contacted by an officer,

at which time the officer discovered that the defendant did not
have a valid driver's license and that her vehicle was not
registered. The passenger was found to have an outstanding warrant
for her arrest and was placed under arrest.

Deputy Shiverdecker

l

10y

was asked to transport the passenger to the jail on the warrant,
and was informed that the vehicle was to be impounded.
While assisting Deputy Adams in removing the occupants from
the vehicle that was to be impounded, Deputy Shiverdecker asked the
defendant to exit the vehicle.
agitated.

She appeared to be extremely

The officer asked if she had any weapons on her person,

to which she responded that she "didn't have a knife."

She had a

number of large objects visibly bulging from her pockets. Based on
her agitation and the fact that she would be left unsupervised
while awaiting a ride, the officer believed it appropriate to
insure the safety of those in the area by conducting a Terry frisk.
In order to facilitate the frisk, Deputy Shiverdecker asked
the defendant to remove the objects from her pockets. She removed
some items from her pockets, but the officer could see several
objects remaining.

When he asked what she had in her pocket, she

did not answer, but pulled a round, plastic container from her
pocket that contained baggies of methamphetamine.
Officers also conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, at
which time they discovered wooden marijuana pipe by the driver's
door, and a quantity of marijuana under the passenger's seat.

At

the jail, the defendant informed the officer that all of the drugs
in the vehicle were hers.

ARGUMENT
Defendant moves to suppress all evidence obtained in this
matter on the basis that the administrative checkpoint was not
2
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KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
CRAIG R. MADSEN #2045
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT

IN THE MATTER OF:
APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT

Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint No. 9

File No.

APPLICATION
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County Sheriffs Office, State
of Utah, hereby respectfully makes application for authorization to conduct an administrative
traffic checkpoint based upon the following plan:
1.

Location:

SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon approximately one (1) mile from the
junction with SR 92 in American Fork Canyon.

Geographical and Topographical Information:
SR 144 is a paved two-lane road. The character of the road has a slight grade.
On the east side of the road is a narrow shoulder wide enough for one vehicle.
On the west side of the road is a large gravel shoulder available for several
vehicles.
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See attached Exhibit "A" for a site diagram and see attached Exhibit WB" for
the ASGS Topographical Map.
2.

3.

Date:

15 June 1992 through 30 September 1992.

Time:

Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m.

Sequence of Traffic to be Stopped:
All traffic, as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah Traffic Code, traveling
east and west shall be stopped. In the event stopped traffic waiting to be
inspected exceeds a five minute wait, all traffic shall be waived through the
checkpoint until there are available personnel to check arriving vehicles.

4.

Purpose:
a. To inspect license plates, registration certificates and insurance cards;
b. To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint requirements;
c. To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired by controlled
substances;
d. To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and other required
exterior safety devices; and
e. To inspect for other apparent criminal activity.
Instructions given to participating deputies regarding operation and purpose are
included in attached Exhibit "C."

5.

Personnel:
A minimum of three uniformed deputies listed on Exhibit "E" attached shall
be present at all times, one of which shall be a uniformed Patrol Sergeant, also
listed on Exhibit "E" attached. The uniformed Patrol Sergeant is the command
level deputy in charge of the checkpoint. The deputy in charge shall be
responsible to maintain the roster of the deputies participating and statistical
information concerning the checkpoint, as provided in attached Exhibit "D."

2

••ocr

6.

Signs, Barriers, etc.:
Exhibit "A" attached includes a sight diagram which depicts the location,
spacing, and the type of signs used to warn approaching vehicles of the
checkpoint.
Photographs in Exhibit MFH attached, depict the site with signs in place.

7.

Advance Notice:
The notice attached as Exhibit "GM will be, or has been, published in the Legal
Notice section of the Provo Daily Herald, running for three consecutive days.
Notice will be run within 30 days prior to the establishment of any checkpoint.

8.

Instructions to Personnel:
a. All participating deputies/officers shall be briefed on the content of this
plan and be given a copy of the Utah County Sheriff Department Policies
and Procedures of Checkpoints/Roadblocks. A copy of which is attached
as Exhibit "G." Each deputy shall be instructed to become familiar and
comply with this plan and the department policies. Significant deviation
from the plan or policy shall require specific permission from the command
level deputy in charge.
b. The command level deputy in charge shall be instructed that every
permission to deviate must be documented by him as to reasons for, nature
of, and the effect of the deviation.
c. Personnel actually conducting the inspection and inquiry shall be instructed:
1. To be courteous and direct motorists to the checkpoint commander if
they wish to examine a copy of the checkpoint plan.
2. To limit the inspection and inquiry to less than one minute per vehicle
unless an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe
an offense is, or has been committed.
3. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists, to move the
vehicle out of line to a secure position where further investigation can
be conducted without impeding the progress of other traffic through the
checkpoint.

3
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4. To direct motorists to proceed with caution and exit the checkpoint area
when the inquiry is complete.
9.

Summary of this Plan Minimizes the Following:
a. Length of time the motorist is delayed, the maximum delay of five minutes,
or if all personnel are busy, then traffic is allowed to pass freely through
the checkpoint site.
b. Intrusion of the inspection or inquiry is minimized in that further intrusion
beyond that described in this plan must be based uppn articulable
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
c. Fear and anxiety are minimized in that advanced publication of the
checkpoint appears in a local newspaper and advance signs are posted,
reading -Sheriffs Checkpoint Ahead" and "Have Driver's License Ready."
d. The degree of discretion is limited to adherence to the Sheriffs Department
Checkpoint Policy. See attached Exhibit "G," instructions to participating
deputies Exhibit "C," and this cite plan.
e. Safety is maximized through the configuration and placement of warning
signs, barricades, flashing lights, traffic cones, auxiliary lighting, i.e.,
vehicle headlights, take down lights or spot lights. Safety of deputies is
maximized through the use of orange reflective vests and orange flashlight
cones.

DATED this

/

<

day of

/^/^^

, 1992.

/
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AUTHORIZATION
The undersigned has reviewed the foregoing plan and finds it to appropriately:
1. Minimize:
a. The length of time motorists will be delayed;
b. The intrusion of the inspection or inquiry;
c. The fear and anxiety of the motorist; and
d. The discretion left to the enforcement officers operating the checkpoint.
2. Maximize the safety of motorists and enforcement officers.
Based thereon, the undersigned hereby authorizes the foregoing Administrative
Traffic Checkpoint.
DATED this /

b

day of

X^^~<

, 1992.
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By the Court:
S

•ClfcjSt COURT JUDGE
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Utah County Sheriff
D A V I D R. B A T E M A N ,

SHERIFF

Lieutenant Craig W. Turner
Patrol Commander
Utah County Sheriff's Department
P.O. Box 330
Provo, Utah 84603

AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT AT SITE #9
SR 144 TIBBLE FORK AREA
Lieutenant Craig W. Turner of the Utah County Sheriff's Department,
herein after referred to as Affiant, being first duly sworn deposes
and says that the following information with reference to the
request before the Court for Administrative Traffic Checkpoints at
Site #9, located on SR144 Tibbie Fork Area in American Fork Canyon
in Utah County is true and correct.
Affiant Craig W. Turner is the Patrol Commander with the Utah
County Sheriff's Department, having served in this capacity since
July 23, 1990. Affiant served as a Patrol Sergeant from February
25, 1985, to July 23, 1990. Affiant has been employed by Utah
County Sheriff's Department since July 1, 1981, and prior to this
date, was a full-time employee with Ogden City Police Department,
assigned to Patrol duties for 2 years and Detective duties for 5
years.
Affiant states that based on his experience and the experienced
opinions of the Utah County Sheriff's Patrol Division Staff, this
proposed checkpoint site is considered to be a problem area in Utah
County with regards to violations of the Utah Code Annotated.
Affiant has conducted traffic checkpoints in the past in American
Fork Canyon locations other than Tibbie Fork and has determined
that the Tibbie Fork area provides those features necessary in the
canyon with regards to the safety issue and the goals of the
checkpoint.
The natural curves on either end of the proposed
checkpoint area act as a speed inhibitor and make it difficult for
drivers to exceed the posted speed limit of 30 mph, further
enhancing the checkpoint supervisor's ability to control all
1
5/So. University Ave, Suite I L>1, Provo. Utah SM01
UAI.INC. u>PRK.s.s P.O. Box330. Provo, Utah S-Um

(S01) 370-SHOO r,
ivx (SOI)370-S$2J
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aspects of the checkpoint. This location also provides ample offroad parking, and escape lanes in the event a vehicle is unable to
stop or chooses to attempt to evade the checkpoint.
Affiant has approved and monitored at least 20 Administrative
Traffic
Checkpoints
sponsored
by the Utah County
Sheriff's
Department at this site since 1984.
The majority of these
checkpoints
have
been
conducted
similarly
to
the
proposed
Checkpoint Plan that is before the Court now. The warning signs and
the placement of these signs in prior checkpoints is very similar
to the current proposed plan.
Affiant has directed the operations of these checkpoints at this
site in daylight and dark, during hot and cold weather, tffider clear
conditions, during rainy conditions and snowing conditions while
utilizing similar checkpoint design and signing devices.
Affiant
has never noticed or been made aware of any problems regarding
safety or visibility to participating law enforcement personnel or
the general public during any of the prior checkpoints at this
site.
Affiant further states that no traffic accidents nor near
accidents have ever happened at this site during a checkpoint or
as a result of a checkpoint at this site.
Affiant has never conducted a checkpoint at this
conditions where ice or snow has accumulated on the
does Affiant plan to conduct any checkpoints at this
condition of this type would significantly reduce the
vehicle to come to a controlled stop.

site during
roadway nor
site when a
ability of a

Affiant further states that the checkpoint will be conducted under
strict compliance with the current Checkpoint Policy of the Utah
County Sheriff's Department in every detail. A copy of the current
policy is included with the proposal before the Court.
Compliance
with this policy includes, but is not limited to, the use of proper
lighting during the hours of dusk and dark. The minimum lighting
that will be used at this checkpoint site during the hours of
darkness will include, but not be limited to the following:
-Five flashing orange barricade lights.
-One flood light provided by a patrol vehicle overhead system.
-One set of flashing hazard lights mounted on a marked patrol
vehicle which will be visible to all traffic approaching the
site.
-Two handheld illuminated orange flashlight wands.
-Reflectorized orange vests worn by all participants.
-Reflectorization on all signs utilized as per the site plan.
-Ten reflectorized traffic cones.
Affiant will require the Checkpoint supervisor to create or have
created a brief video tape of each checkpoint that is conducted at
this site.
If the checkpoint is conducted during daylight hours
and extends into dark, the supervisor will create a brief video of
2
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the checkpoint during daylight and dark hours.
This video
documentation will be maintained on a permanent basis by the
Affiant,
Affiant will require the Checkpoint supervisor to furnish the
original written briefing plan and the debriefing plan to the
Affiant for inclusion in a permanent site record which will be
maintained by the Affiant,
Affiant further states that the checkpoint plan as submitted to the
Court has been examined in detail by the Utah County Sheriff's
Department Traffic Accident Specialist, who is certified as an
accident and traffic specialist by Northwestern University and is
currently recognized as a traffic accident reconstruction expert by
various courts within Utah County. The specialist has informed me
that he has examined this site in regards to all road conditions
both natural and man made, speed limits, visibility, stopping
distances and all other factors which may have an effect on the
safety of this proposed plan. The specialist has informed me that
this plan as proposed is, in his opinion, safe. The specialist has
also assured Affiant that, in the proposed plan, he has factored in
an acceptable margin of error in the event of excessive speed of
vehicles entering the checkpoint warning area.
WHEREFORE, Affiant swears and deposes that the information
contained herein is true and correct to the best of Affiant%s
knowledge and belief.

fax £/. ,
fAffiarft
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /^"gay of ^\jAsy^g

My Commission Expires:

9- 23-?p
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KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
CRAIG R. MADSEN #2045
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT

IN THE MATTER OF:

:
:

Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint No. 9

ORDER AUTHORIZING
ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT

:

:

File No.

&Z /-//7$

/MS

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Lynn Davis presiding, on the State's
Application for Administrative Checkpoint filed on or about June 15, 1992. The Court, having
considered the application and made and entered its findings of fact and being fully advised in
the premises, does hereby issue the following authorization to Craig Turner, a command level
officer in the Utah County Sheriffs Office, to operate an administrative traffic checkpoint to be
supervised by any of the following command level sergeants of the Utah County Sheriffs Office:
Kerry Evans, Jens Horn, Alex Hunt, Mike McConnell or Jim Tracy.
1. Location: SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon approximately one (1) mile from the
junction with SR 92 in American Fork Canyon.
Geographical and Topographical Information:
SR 144 is a paved two-lane road. The character of the road has a slight grade.
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On the east side of the road is a narrow shoulder wide enough for one vehicle.
On the west side of the road is a large gravel shoulder available for several
vehicles.
See attached Exhibit "A" for a site diagram and see attached Exhibit "B" for the
ASGS Topographical Map. (All Exhibits in this order refer to exhibits attached
to the application and are hereby incorporated by reference and shall also be
attached to this order.)
2. Date: 15 June 1992 through 30 September 1992.
Time: Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m.
3. Sequence of Traffic to be Stopped:
All traffic, as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah Traffic Code, traveling
east and west shall be stopped. In the event stopped traffic waiting to be
inspected exceeds a five minute wait, all traffic shall be waived through the
checkpoint until there are available personnel to check arriving vehicles.
4. Purpose:
a. To inspect license plates, registration certificates and insurance cards;
b. To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint requirements;
c. To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired by controlled
substances;
d. To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and other required
exterior safety devices; and
e. To inspect for other apparent criminal activity.
Instructions given to participating deputies regarding operation and purpose are
included in attached Exhibit "C."
5.

Personnel:
A minimum of three uniformed deputies listed on Exhibit "E" attached shall
be present at all times, one of which shall be a uniformed Patrol Sergeant, also
listed on Exhibit "E" attached. The uniformed Patrol Sergeant is the command
level deputy in charge of the checkpoint. The deputy in charge shall be
responsible to maintain the roster of the deputies participating and statistical
2
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information concerning the checkpoint, as provided in attached Exhibit "D."
Participating deputies may be any of the Sheriffs officers identified in Exhibit
"EM provided that any officer participating is fully briefed and operates in
accordance with this order.
6.

Signs, Barriers, etc:
Exhibit "A" attached includes a sight diagram which depicts the location,
spacing, and the type of signs used to warn approaching vehicles of the
checkpoint.
Photographs in Exhibit "F" attached, depict the site with sign§ in place.

7.

Advance Notice:
The notice attached as Exhibit "G" will be, or has been, published in the Legal
Notice section of the Provo Daily Herald, running for three consecutive days.
Notice will run within 30 days prior to the establishment of any checkpoint.

8.

Instructions to Personnel:
a. All participating deputies/officers shall be briefed on the content of this
plan and be given a copy of the Utah County Sheriff Department Policies
and Procedures of Checkpoints/Roadblocks. A copy of which is attached
as Exhibit "G." Each deputy shall be instructed to become familiar and
comply with this plan and the department policies. Significant deviation
from the plan or policy shall require specific permission from the command
level deputy in charge.
b. The command level deputy in charge shall be instructed that every
permission to deviate must be documented by him as to reasons for, nature
of, and the effect of the deviation.
c. Personnel actually conducting the inspection and inquiry shall be instructed:
1. To be courteous and direct motorists to the checkpoint commander if
they wish to examine a copy of the checkpoint plan.
2. To limit the inspection and inquiry to less than one minute per vehicle
unless an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe
an offense is, or has been committed.
3. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists, to move the
vehicle out of line to a secure position where further investigation can
3

rs r -

APA

be conducted without impeding the progress of other traffic through the
checkpoint.
4. To direct motorists to proceed with caution and exit the checkpoint area
when the inquiry is complete.
9.

A copy of this order shall be retained in the Court's file. The original shall be
issued to Lt. Craig Turner, the command officer who executed the application for
this order.

10. A copy of the roadblock plan and this signed authorization together with all
attachments shall be issued to the patrol sergeant participating and^n command of
the operation of the checkpoint.
11. All enforcement officers participating in the operation of the checkpoint shall
conform their activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined in the
plan.
12. The checkpoint command level officer (patrol sergeant in charge) shall be available
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any motorist who has been
stopped at the checkpoint upon request of the motorist.
Based thereon, the undersigned hereby authorizes the foregoing Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint.
DATED this /5~

day of _ _ j ^ ^ ^ f Z

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
•ft***********************

IN THE MATTER OF:

FINDINGS

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT NO. 9
(SR 144 Tibbie Fork Canyon)

CASE NO.

**************************

On June 15, 1992, the Utah County Attorney's office, together
with Lt. Craig W. Turner of the Utah County Sheriff's office,
submitted

a

written

application

and

authorization

for

an

administrative traffic checkpoint. The only issue before the court
is whether the authorization which is sought is allowed by virtue
of compliance with House Bill 259.

The constitutionality of

administrative checkpoints under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of Utah's Constitution
is not at issue.

The application is supported with over 20 pages

of exhibits, 8 relevant photographs, and a copy of House Bill No.
2 59, the Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act.
information

regarding

the

safety

of

the

Supplemental

motorists

and

the

enforcement officers was required by Judge Lynn W. Davis.

Lt.

Craig W. Turner, Patrol Commander of the Utah County Sheriff's
submitted a supporting affidavit dated June 12, 1992.
has

carefully

reviewed

the

application

and

the

This court
exhibits

to

determine compliance with the Act. Of major concern of this court,
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is the protection of citizenry; the health, safety and welfare of
the travelling and pedestrian and law enforcement public are vital.
This court makes the following:
FINDINGS
1. House Bill 259 (Administrative traffic Checkpoint Act) was
passed in the 1992 session of the Utah State Legislature.
2. House Bill 259 went into effect on Monday, April 27, 1992.
3. The application seeks authority to stop vehicles under 7723-103(5) which purports to allow vehicle stops and

occupant

detention when the enforcement officer "is acting pursuant to a
duly authorized administrative traffic checkpoint authority granted
by a magistrate in accordance with § 77-23-104."
4.

For the purposes herein, Judge Lynn W. Davis, a Fourth

Circuit Court Judge, is acting as a magistrate.
5.
command

Officer Craig Turner, Deputy Utah County Sheriff, is a
level

officer

and

has

submitted

a

written

plan

in

conformity with 77-23-104(2)(a)(i).
6.

The

location

of the checkpoint, geographically

and

topographically, is adequately described in paragraph 1 of the
application.

An ASGS

topographical

map

is attached

to the

application as Exhibit "B" and the photographs in Exhibit "F"
further visually describe the area. The application fully complies
with the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(i).
7.

The date, time and duration of the checkpoints are

adequately described in paragraph No. 2 of the application and the
applicant has complied

fully with the requirements of 77-232
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104 (2) (a)(ii).

There is nothing in the Act which would appear to

preclude the seeking of a multiple-day authority as recjuested by
the applicant herein.

Faithful compliance with the plan would, of

course, be necessary on all authorized days.
8.

The sequence of the traffic to be stopped is adequately

and reasonably identified in paragraph No. 3 in the application and
the applicant has fully complied with the requirements of 77-23104(2)(a)(iii).
9.

The purpose of the checkpoint and the inspection or

inquiry to be conducted are adequately and reasonably identified in
paragraph

No.

4,

a,

b,

c,

d,

and

e

of

the

application.

Furthermore, the court finds that Exhibit "C" attached to the
application supplements the purposes and the inquiry set forth in
the application.

The court specifically finds that the applicant

has complied with the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(iv).
10.

The request of the applicant is for a continuing, large

scale checkpoint for 75 days.

By virtue of that uniqueness, the

applicant has provided a pool of names of officers who will
participate in the checkpoints. The pool is comprised of the names
of officers who actually will participate, but the exact assignment
has not yet been determined.

Paragraph No. 5 of the application

provides that a minimum of three uniformed deputies will be present
at each checkpoint, with one being a uniformed patrol sergeant.
The patrol sergeant shall be the command level deputy in charge of
the checkpoint.

The court further finds that the patrol sergeant

shall maintain a roster of participating deputies.
3

00A

046

While 77-23-104(2)(a)(v) appears to require exactitude in the
naming of personnel, it certainly does not appear that a pool of
names as provided herein would be necessarily precluded.
This

court

finds

that

the

information

contained

within

paragraph No. 5 of the application, together with the information
contained

in

Exhibit

"E"

sufficiently

complies

with

the

requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a) (v) . (This court, as an aside, has
also made this finding of compliance based upon the best interests
of justice, judicial economy, 1 court case as opposed to 75 cases
opened reducing clerk staff time etc., and based upon the realities
of law enforcement and daily life; law enforcement officers may be
called

at any

time, even while

conducting

a

checkpoint, to

emergencies and/or a specifically identified officer may become
sick, etc.

Would a substitution of an equally trained, qualified

and competent officer defeat the checkpoint, absent magisterial
sanction for the substitution?
is

that

trained,

uniformed

The critical concern of this court
officers, conduct

the

checkpoint

according to the magisterial authorized plan and that a patrol
sergeant be present who is in charge.

The pooled concept appears

both to meet the intent of the law and the health, safety and
welfare concerns of this court in protecting the travelling and
pedestrian and law enforcement citizenry of this community.)
11.

Exhibit

"A"

attached

to

the

application

and

the

photographs in Exhibit "F" depict the types and location/site, and
spacing of signage which will be used.

The application satisfies

the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a) (vi) .
4
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12.

A reference is made to advance notice in paragraph 7 of

the application.

Legal notice, though very generic, has been or

will be published in the Legal Notice section of the Provo Daily
Herald, running for three consecutive days. Notice is or has been
run within 30 days prior to the establishment of the requested
checkpoint.

The application is supported by Exhibit "G", which

contains a copy of the Legal Notice published on Wednesday, April
15, 1992 in Section D page 3 of the Provo Daily Herald.
publication has also been presented.

Proof of

The court takes judicial

notice that the Provo Daily Herald is a newspaper of wide and
general circulation in Utah County. Accordingly, this court finds
the application meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(vii).
13. Exhibit "C" attached to the application details the
instructions that will be read by each Officer involved in the
operation of the checkpoint and satisfies the requirement of 77-23104(2)(a)(viii).
14.

The court finds that the plan minimizes the length of

time the motorist will be delayed (77-23-104(2)(b)(i)) because of
the following:
a)

Routine inspection and inquiry is expected to be
less than one minute in duration; (see Utah
County Sheriff Checkpoint Briefing Instruction,
paragraph 6, attached as Exhibit "C").

b)

In the event stopped traffic waiting to be
inspected exceeds a 5 minute wait, all traffic
shall be waived through checkpoint until there
5

OCT

044

are

available

vehicles.
c)

Safety

personnel

to

check

arriving

(Application paragraph 3 ) .

precautions

have

been

faithfully

addressed.
15.

The Court further finds that the intrusion upon the

travelling public is minimal and that the plan anticipates that
routine inspection and inquiry is expected to take less than one
minute

in duration.

Instructions).

(Utah County

Sheriff

77-23-104(2)(b)(ii) .

Checkpoint

Briefing

Deviation from the plan is

not permitted except as authorized under specific circumstances.
16. The court finds under 77-23-104(2)(b)(iii), that the plan
takes measures to attempt to minimize the fear and anxiety the
motorist will experience by virtue of:
a)

signage;

b)

notice;

c)

the location of the checkpoint is a straight-of-way;

d)

safety issues have been faithfully addressed;

e)

pull off areas for the travelling public are provided;

17.
be

The court further finds that the degree of discretion to

exercised

checkpoint

by

individual

is minimized

enforcement

officers

(77-23-104(2)(b)(iv))

operating

the

by virtue of the

following:
a)

the exact location is established;

b)

the signage is established by the plan;

c)

the

length

of

time

the

established by the plan;

6

motorist

will

be

delayed

is

d)

sequence of traffic issues are addressed by the plan;

e)

inquiry is limited under the plan;

f)

any necessary further inspections will be conducted out of
traffic lanes;

g)

most importantly, any deviation from the checkpoint plan
or policy shall require specific permission from the
checkpoint supervisor who shall document the reasons for,
nature of and effect of any deviation (Utah County Sheriff
Checkpoint Briefing Instructions, page 2, 2(d)),

18.

The application satisfies the requirements of 77-23-

104(2)(a)(v). The utilization of signage, notice, flashing lights
take into account safety measures to protect the travelling and
pedestrian traffic. The location chosen has pull off areas and is
a straight-of-way.

This finding is based upon the plan of the

exhibits submitted and the affidavit of Officer Craig Turner.
Specifically, the court relies upon the affidavit which supports
the facts that the court finds that:
a)

the

choice

of

location

is

based

upon

safety

considerations;
b)

SR 144, approx 1 mi. from the junction with SR92 in
American

Fork

Canyon

provides

the

best

conditions

available with regards to safety issues and the goals and
purposes of the checkpoint;
c)

Lt. Turner has participated in or supervised at least 20
checkpoints at this location since 1984;

d)

it is a location where the patrol sergeant (supervisor)
7
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can control all aspects of the checkpoint;
e)

the location provides escape lanes in the event a vehicle
is unable to stop or chooses to attempt to evade the
checkpoint;

f)

the warning signage and placement is similar to that
utilized in the past and safety problems to the travelling
public

and

the participating

officers have not been

problematical;
g)

no traffic accidents nor near accidents have ever happened
at this site during a checkpoint or as a result of a
checkpoint at this site;

h)

adequate lighting will be utilized to alert the travelling
public when conducted at night;

i)

the plan has been submitted to, and examined in detail by,
the Utah County Sheriff's Department Traffic Accident
Specialist, who is certified as an accident and traffic
specialist by Northwestern University and who is currently
recognized as a traffic accident reconstruction expert by
courts in Utah County;

j)

said specialist has examined the plan with respect to all
road conditions, both natural and man made, speed limits,
visibility, stopping distances and all other factors which
may have an effect on the safety of the proposed plan;

k)

in addition, the specialist has factored in an acceptable
margin of error in the event of excessive speed of
vehicles entering the checkpoint warning area;
8

k)

after thorough examination and review, the Departments
Traffic Accident Specialist has opined that the plan, as
submitted, is safe.

18.

By virtue of the above findings, this court specifically

finds that the plan meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(b) as
required by 77-23-104(3) and the balance of the requirements of the
Act and that authorization to conduct the checkpoint in accordance
with the plan may issue.
DATED this /3~

day of June, 1992.

L¥tfN W. DAVIS
Fourth Circuit Court Judge
Acting as Magistrate
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Craig R. Madsen
Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo,Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)370-8026
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:
Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint Nos.l through 9

AMENDMENT TO
APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
,,iX's
TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT
^ Z / ^ ' ' /J> /

FILE NO.
AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION

°j Z f — 1°

Z

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and
upon changes sought in the original authorizations.
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The administrative checkpoints executed to date haveresultedin over 4,000
vehicles passing through the checkpoints with no accidents or problems occuring at any
checkpoint Approximately 15 complaints have beenreceivedfrom citizens at checkpoints
out of the approximately 4,504 vehicles involved.

PERSONNEL CHANGES

1. In each existing application and authorization it isrequestedthat the following
names be added as authorized participants:

Qfficcr/Trogpg,

Qreaniation/AgCTcy

Delbert Atkinson
Lynn Briggs
Howard Jaquart
Jody Becker
Kevin Cherry
Cliff Helms
Karen Green
Vic Layton

Department of Wildlife Resources
Department of Wildlife Resources
Department of Wildlife Resources
Department of Wildlife Resources
Department of Wildlife Resources
Department of Wildlife Resources
Department of Wildlife Resources
Department of Wildlife Resources

(all of the above are certified law enforcement officers with the State department
named)
SITE AMENDMENTS
CHECKPOINT SITE #1

1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized
:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #2

..000
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1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized
t****

i :00 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #3
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized
q
OH*.
times of operation be amended to include between 4:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #4
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between t:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #5
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between f :00 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #6
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized
r

:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #7

.,000
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1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between t:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #8
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 1:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #9
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 1:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m

DATED this J/

day of August, 1992

1/llHv %./'

JA

'"^t^*
UGa#Tumer
Utah County Sheriffs Office
AMENDED AUTHORIZATION
THIS MATTER having come before the court through this Amended Application
and the court having examined the original applications for each site requested together with
the requested amendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each
of therequestedamendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT:

1. The requested amendments are hereby authorized and incorporated into the
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered
placed in each of the files together with the original applications and authorizations.
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court
DATED this

}l

day of

A ^ g ^ ^ 1 ^ . 1992. ^ - r ?
BY THE COURT

//

c

7

* ^

^ , 3 0 c ' *•»- f/s.

Judge of the Fourth Grcuit^Jbiirt
A -'>sv

\^o,.,-.,y--r
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Craig R. Madsen
Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo,Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:
AMENDMENT TO
APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT

Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint Nos. 1 through 9

I

FILE NO.

AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and
upon changes sought in the original authorizations.
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The administrative checkpoints executed to date haveresultedin over 6,000
vehicles passing through the checkpoints with no accidents or problems occuring at any
checkpoint Approximately 20 complaints have been received from citizens at checkpoints
out of the approximately 6,500 vehicles involved.
PERSONNEL

CHANGES

1. In each existing application and authorization it isrequestedthat the following
names be added as authorized participants:

Qfficg/Trogpcr

Qw<\n\7a\m/h^m

Rick Mayo
Utah Highway Patrol
Erik Brinkman
Utah Highway Patrol
Margaret Haidie
Utah Highway Patrol
Thayes Brailsfond
Utah Highway Patrol
Hobie Metz
Utah Highway Patrol
Marie Millett
Utah Highway Patrol
Sam Naylor
Utah Highway Patrol
(all of the above are certified law enforcement officers with the State department
named)
SITE AMENDMENTS
CHECKPOINT SITE #1

1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between ^ # 0 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #2

•000
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1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between tmd p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #3
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 Febniaiy 1993, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between A60 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #4
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include lfcDecember 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 4SB0 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #5
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 9B0 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #6
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized
u : ho
times of operation be amended to include between £80 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #7

1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between *ii©Q p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #8
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 66Q p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #9
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between (590 p.m. and 2:30 a m

DATED this X > ^ d a y of December, 1992

UQ^fe Turner
Utah County Sheriffs Office
AMENDED AUTHORIZATION
I M S MATTER having come before the court through this Amended Application
and the court having examined the original applications for each siterequestedtogether with
therequestedamendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each
of therequestedamendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT:

1. Therequestedamendments arc hereby authorized and incoiporated into the
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered
placed in each of the files together with the original applications and authorizations,
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court
DATED this

3»

day of December, 1992.
BYTHE COURT

Judge of tBe Fourth Ofcuit Court

•OuO
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Craig R. Madsen
Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo.Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:
AMENDMENT TO
APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT

Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint Nos. 1 through 9

FileNo.s 921000851,921000903
921000852, 921000902, 921000901
921000900, 921000899, 921000898
MS _
/

AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and
upon changes sought in the original authorizations.

•000
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The administrative checkpoints executed to date haveresultedin over 11,000
vehicles passing through the checkpoints with no accidents or problems ocuning at any
checkpoint Approximately 50 complaints have been received from citizens at checkpoints
out of the approximately 11,000 vehicles involved.
PERSONNEL

CHANGES

1. In each existing application and authorization it isrequestedthat the following
names be added as authorized participants:
Offigq/TtTOpgr

Organization/Agencv

Kent Comaby
Dave Griffel
Tim Clark

US Forest Savice Law Enforcement
US Forest Service Law Enforcement
US Forest Service Law Enforcement

(all of the above are certified law enforcement officers with the department named)

SITE AMENDMENTS
C H E C K P O I N T SITE #1
( Court File # 921000851 MS)

1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m

CHECKPOINT SITE #2
(Court File # 921000903 MS)

1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #3
(Court File # 921000852 MS)
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #4
(Court File # 921000902 MS)
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #5
(Court File # 921000901 MS)
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m

CHECKPOINT SITE #6
(Court File # 921000900 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 am.
CHECKPOINT SITE #7
(Court File # 921000899 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #8
(Court File # 921000898 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #9
(Court File #
MS
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.

DATED this

day of May, 1993

LtQaig Turner
Utah County Sh&tff s Office
AMENDED AUTHORIZATION
THIS MATTER having come before the court through this Amended Application
and the court having examined the original applications for each siterequestedtogether with
therequestedamendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each
of therequestedamendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT:
1. Therequestedamendments are hereby authorized and incorporated into the
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered
placed in each of the files together with the original applications and authorizations.
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court
DATED this £ ^

day of May, 1993.
BYTHE COURT

PROVO C»TV

JUL

court!
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Craig R. Madsen

Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo.Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:
AMENDMENT TO
APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT

Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint Nos.l through 9

FileNo.s 921000851,921000903
921000852, 921000902, 921000901
921000900, 921000899, 921000898
9210001173 MS
/

AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and
upon changes sought in the original authorizations.

..000
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PERSONNEL

CHANGES

1. In each existing application and authorization it isrequestedthat the following
names be added as authorized participants:
QffiOT/TlWPgT
Chad Stiison
David Bytheway
Fred Swain
Tracy Simmons
ToddJohnson
Carolyn Stencil-Gosse
Mike Gosse

Utah Highway Patrol
Utah Highway Patrol
Utah Highway Patrol
Utah Highway Patrol
Utah Highway Patrol
U.S. Forest Service
U.S. Park Service/Timpanogos N.M.

(all of the above are certified law enforcement officers with the depanment named)
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SITE AMENDMENTS
CHECKPOINT SITE #1
( Court File # 921000851 MS)

1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized times
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #2
(Court File # 921000903 MS)

1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #3
(Court File # 921000852 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized times
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #4
(Court File # 921000902 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.

•000

071

CHECKPOINT SITE #5
(Court File # 921000901 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #6
(Court File # 921000900 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #7
(Court File # 921000899 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #8
(Court File # 921000898 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m

-000
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CHECKPOINT SITE #9
(Court File # 9210001173 MS
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m

DATED t h i s _ 2 ^ d a y of £weVl994

LL Alex Hunt
Utah County Sheriffs Office

.000
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AMENDED AUTHORIZATION
THIS MATTER having come before the court through this Amended Application
and the court having examined the original applications for each siterequestedtogether with
therequestedamendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each
of therequestedamendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT:
1. Therequestedamendments are hereby authorized and incorporated into the
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court.
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered
placed in each of the files together with the original applications and authorizations.
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court.
DATED this

'

day of Jtmc, 1994.
BY THE COURT

Judge ofthe Fourth CircuitGourt

• • • ;. .
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Craig R. Madsen
Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo.Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)370-8026
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:
Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint Nos. 1 through 9

AMENDMENT TO
APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT
File No.s 921000851,921000903
921000852, 921000902, 921000901
921000900, 921000899, 921000898
9210001173 MS
I

AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and
upon changes sought in the original authorizations.
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PERSONNEL CHANGES

1. In each existing application and authorization it isrequestedthat the following
changes be added as authorized participants:
All sworn and/or certified law enforcement ofificcrs for the following State and
Federal agencies:
a. Utah County Sheriff s Office
b. Utah Highway Patrol
c. Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
d. U.S. Forest Service
f. Utah State Paries and Recreation
2. That the command level / supervisor for each checkpoint shall be any Sergeant,
Lieutenant or Captain of the Utah County Sheriffs Office.

SITE AMENDMENTS
CHECKPOINT SITE #1
( Court File # 921000851 MS)

1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #2
(Court File # 921000903 MS)

1. ft isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #3
(Court File # 921000852 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times of
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #4
(Court File # 921000902 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.
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CHECKPOINT SITE #5
(Court File # 921000901 MS)
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized tjmes
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.nx and 2:30 a.m.
CHECKPOINT SITE #6
(Court File # 921000900 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.nx
CHECKPOINT SITE #7
(Court File # 921000899 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.nx and 2:30 a m
CHECKPOINT SITE #8
(Court File # 921000898 MS)
1. It isrequestedthat the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.nx and 2:30 a m
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CHECKPOINT SITE #9
(Court File # 9210001173 MS
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m.

DATED this

day of May, 1995

Li Chug Turner
*—-^
Utah County Sheriffs Office

..JvC
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AMENDED AUTHORIZATION
THIS MATTER having come before die coun through this Amended Application
and the court having examined the original applications for each siterequestedtogether with
therequestedamendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each
of therequestedamendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT:
1. Therequestedamendments are hereby authorized and incorporated into the
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered
placed in each of thefilestogether with the original applications and authorizations.
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court
DATED this ^ >

day of May, 1996.
BYTHE COURT

Jiidg^of the Fourth Judicial District Court/
Magistrate
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 961400364
DATE: September 11, 1996

v.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

LISA DEHERRERA,
Defendants.

LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration.
Having received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda both in support of and
in opposition to the Motion, the Court delivers the following Memorandum Decision.

Opinion of the Couit
The Court finds that the Defendant's arguments in support of her Motion to Reconsider
are fact sensitive issues that have been sufficiently addressed in the Court's prior ruling. In
addition, the Defendant argues that the Court should reconsider based on the State's failure to
proffer evidence in support of the Good Faith Exception. The Court finds that there is no
requirement for the State to prove good faith when the officers were acting pursuant to what
they believed was a valid warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.

Denuf-

Order
The Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration is denied.
Dated this llth day of September, 1996.
BY THE COURT

cc:

Public Defender, Esq.
County Attorney, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 961400364
DATE: July 5T 1996

v.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

LISA DEHERRERA,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Defendants Motion to
Suppress. Having received and considered the Motion, and having heard and considered the
evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's Motion.
Factual Background
On September 16, 1995 the Defendant approached an administrative checkpoint near
the Tibbie Fork Junction in American Fork Canyon. The Utah County Sheriffs Office had
set up a roadblock which had been judicially approved. The Defendant was driving as she
and her passengers neared the roadblock. Upon reaching the roadblock the Defendant was
questioned by an officer who discovered that the Defendant was driving an unregistered
vehicle and that she did not have a valid driver's license.
Furthermore, it was discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for one of the
passengers who was placed under arrest. After speaking with the other passengers, and

110

finding that there was no one who could legally drive the vehicle, the officers were forced to
impound the vehicle.
Deputy Shiverdecker asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle at which time he noticed
her agitated character. Realizing that she, with the other passengers, would be waiting at the
roadblock unattended until their ride came, Deputy Shiverdecker asked if the Defendant had
any weapons. The Defendant stated that she "did not have a knife." The Deputy, suspicious
of her answer, attempted to neutralize the situation to assure the safety of those at the
roadblock by conducting a Terry search of the Defendant
The Deputy conducted the Terry frisk by first patting down the Defendant's left pants
pocket which he felt contained change and other insignificant items. While patting down the
right pants pocket of the Defendant, Deputy Shiverdecker found it extremely full and bulging
such that he was unable to discern what the pocket contained. To facilitate the search the
Deputy asked the Defendant to empty her pocket which she did, however not completely.
The Deputy noted that there was still a bulge in her pocket and asked the Defendant what it
was. The Defendant then proceeded voluntarily to extract a small container which through its
transparent walls it appeared to contain methamphetamine.
Opinion of the Court
L

Fourth Amendment Principles
A.

Regarding the Roadblock
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a roadblock.

Michigan State Police v. Sitzy 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990). However, this "seizure" is
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reasonable in light of the Fourth Amendment upon applying a balancing analysis. Sitz, 496
U.S. at 455. This balancing analysis includes 3 criterion; 1) the state's interest in preventing
accidents caused by drunk drivers, 2) the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving
that goal, and 3) the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints.
Id. at 449. When these criterion are met the roadblocks are allowed in order to check for
drunk drivers.
The applicable procedure for these "administrative traffic checkpoints" is set forth in
sections 77-23-101 through 77-23-105 of the Utah Code. The purpose of the roadblock, its
date, time and duration, the names of the personnel working the checkpoint, and the
instructions to be given to the officers at the checkpoint all need to be provided in the plan
which must be signed by a magistrate in order to effectuate the checkpoint. Utah Code § 7723-104 (1992). It is the responsibility of the Magistrate to ensure that the plan as proposed
and presented by the law enforcement officers does not violate any of the above 3 criterion in
Sitz and the limits set forth by the statute.
The officers who obtain the plan from the Magistrate invoke what the Supreme Court
termed a "good faith" rule which precludes the exclusion of evidence seized by an officer
when acting in good faith upon a warrant. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
B.

Regarding the Search of the Defendant's Person
Warrantless searches are constitutionally permissible only where probable cause and

exigent circumstances exist. State v. Larvcco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). Such exigent
circumstances exist when a police officer feels that he or someone else may be in danger.
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This is measured by the "reasonably prudent man under the circumstances" standard. State v.
Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988), quoting State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah
1986).
LL
A.

Analysis
Regarding the Roadblock
Applying these Fourth Amendment principles to the present case, the Court finds that

with regards to the roadblock, the plan for the administrative checkpoint did not comply with
the terms of the statute because it was overly broad making it invalid and unconstitutional.
However, this situation is similar to that of obtaining a search warrant.

There is a

presumption, as stated above, that when an officer relies upon a warrant that has been
reviewed and issued by a neutral judge he is acting in good faith which precludes the
evidence from being excluded. Similarly, in the instant case, where the plan for the
roadblock was submitted to and approved by a magistrate the officers should be able to rely
upon such approval in good faith and therefore the evidence should not be suppressed because
of the good faith exception.
The statute describes various specifics with which the administrative checkpoint must
comply before it is to be approved by the judiciary. The time, date, duration, the names of
the personnel to be employed at the checkpoint, and the instructions and purpose of the
checkpoint must be included.
Although in the instant case the time, date and duration are included in the plan the
Court finds that an ongoing checkpoint which may be set up at any time over a period of a

year is entirely too long and does not meet the intent of the statute.
Also, the names of the personnel are required to be on the plan, in this case merely the
office from which they were to come was placed on the plan. Thus, the specificity that the
statute requires was not included in the plan.
Lastly, the purpose as well as the instructions which the officers have at the roadblock
went beyond the scope of the statute. The roadblocks are ideally set up to check for drunk
drivers. By broadening the search the officers violate the third criterion of the Sitz test and
the search conducted at the roadblock becomes too intrusive upon an individual's rights.
B.

Regarding the Search of Defendant's Person
Applying the above Fourth Amendment principles the Court finds that there were

sufficient exigent circumstances to authorize Deputy Shiverdecker's search of the Defendant's
person.
The Deputy was justified in performing the search of the Defendant because of the
circumstances that required the Deputy to leave the Defendant unattended at the checkpoint as
well as the agitated character of the Defendant, the suspicious answer regarding a "knife," and
the bulging pocket.
The Deputy conducted the Terry search in an effort to reduce the possibility of harm
to himself or to his fellow officers. The following request to have the Defendant empty the
contents of her pocket was reasonable because the Deputy was unable to identify the objects
by merely feeling through the pockets. Furthermore, questioning her about what still
remained in her pocket was still within the bounds of the search and her voluntary production

of the item in no way provides reason which would allow the Court to suppress the evidence.
The search of Defendant's person was allowed because of the exigent circumstances
and the evidence will not be suppressed.
Order
Counsel for the Plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an
order within 15 days of this decision consistent with and in support of the terms of this
memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission
to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until such order is
signed by the Court.
Dated this-jfi&day of July, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Mariane O'Bryant, Esq.
Michael E. Jewell, Esq.
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